I wake up every day combing the headlines, looking in the news for a car bomb that went off and killed dozens in Cairo. But not yet. Not today. This isn’t to say that I’m hoping for one, but let’s not kid ourselves here, we know what is coming. Both sides in Egypt know what is coming. Too many souls have been taken to go back to pretending nothing happened. Everyone has blood on their hands.
The standoff between Egypt’s military and supporters of Mohammed Morsi has left hundreds of people dead and thousands injured. Here are some takeaways from what has happened in Egypt in recent weeks:
1. Even if we do cut off aid to Egypt, don’t buy the argument that if we do that the ISF will all of a sudden start a war with Israel. Even without our help the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces, c’mon guys, get with the acronyms!) would embarrass them. Both have an interest in maintaining a stable Sinai Peninsula and Suez and maintaining good relations with the United States. If anything, expect Israel to further their ties with the ISF and reaffirm their commitment to their security relationship in the absence of U.S. support.
2. In anticipation of our cutting Egypt off, the Saudis and the rest of the Gulf monarchies all pledged to commit billions in funds and armaments. And so did our friend, Vladimir Putin, with “no strings attached” by the way. That means more influence for geopolitical and regional rivals, less influence for us.
3. The removal of one man does not mean the removal of his regime. The ouster of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt just two years ago was not the ouster of the regime Mubarak oversaw: here, I’m talking the Armed Forces, the police, the Intelligence apparatus (and the secret police), the cartels composed of the privileged and the elite who have their hands in the economic hand-basket that we see going to hell, among others. These people, these networks, are what I am calling the “regime.” They have a vested interest in maintaining their positions in Egyptian society, and I do not see them simply disappearing because of some popular elections. They, particularly the military, remain the true powerbroker of the state system in Egypt. In truth, the “revolution” we saw two years ago was not a revolution. A revolution is a fundamental/complete change in the established order. The “revolution” people have been talking about hasn’t actually happened, at least not yet.
4. Building off the previous point, the military is the only institution capable of holding the Egyptian state together. And they are not leaving anytime soon. For reasons mentioned above, the Arab world (in this case Egypt, but the MENA region in general) did not have the roots of liberal democracy that could take over during the Arab Awakening. There have also not been many modernizing autocrats who built broad, educated middle classes that could organize themselves and eventually effectively take control. The only two parties that have that sort of discipline and structure is the ISF (military) and the Muslim Brotherhood. If you cannot entertain even the thought of that-which-was-just-mentioned, I really don’t know what to say.
That being said, militaries are often quite reluctant to get involved in the long-term, day-to-day governance of a country. It’s too complicated and messy. The determining factor is whether or not there are any groups or institutions to hand that role over to. After what the Muslim Brotherhood tried to pull over the last year, they have reason to be cautious and uncertain.
We think of democracy as the standard, the measure by which we assess a country’s progress. But progress is indeed possible without democracy preceding it. Take Latin America as an example: for all of the horrible things Pinochet and his cronies did in Chile, he played into our anticommunist containment strategy fairly well. At the same time it is safe to say the country as we know it today would be nothing if it weren’t for the reforms he strong-armed through. It is now considered one of South America’s most stable and prosperous nations, and a liberal democracy at that. But the former came first. The same can be said of Fujimori of Peru, who helped eradicate the Shining Path, the Maoist terrorist group, and put Peru on a path of economic growth that makes it as competitive (in conjunction with several other economies) as China. And although he has stood trial for crimes against humanity, the name Fujimori is revered; in fact his daughter is a member of the Peruvian legislature and almost won the Presidency in 2011 (she lost in a runoff by 3 percentage points). Look to Asia for more examples. China, Japan, Singapore, India; they have their share of decades of strongmen, dictators, and shady democrats with authoritarian tendencies, but the kicker was that most of them were modernizers. Think Nehru, Lee Kuan Yew, Deng Xiaoping; these were people who focused on building infrastructure, both physical and intellectual. This, coupled with entrepreneurship and an export-led economy is a chief reason why we’re seeing a rising middle class in these countries. A strong middle class and relative political stability are precursors to a peaceful transition to liberal democracy (that is, if that’s what the people want. Citizens of Singapore for example seem to be content with their situation).
All speculation aside, as I remember my history, our own revolution was not an easy transition either; it led to a bloody civil war a half century later. We seem to expect that others will do it differently. I don’t know of any society that has changed without struggle. We didn’t. The Russians certainly didn’t. The French didn’t. Neither have any of the African states or most of the Asias ones. In the short history of mankind, we seem to spend a good deal of time either plotting to conquer or kill each other. If you think Egyptians won’t do the same, I challenge you to pick up a newspaper and tell me I’m wrong.