Entschuldigung: The CIA’s Trip-up, and a Story that Could Shed Some Light on it

There's nothing more sensitive than spying on a friendly country. But let's have some perspective.

There’s nothing more sensitive than spying on a friendly country. But let’s give this some perspective.

A few years ago I interviewed one of our veterans who served in Japan shortly after the Korean War.  They worked and trained alongside the Japanese SDF.  The young officer was in frequent planning meetings with higher ranking officers

After one meeting, when the others began filing out, one of his superiors asked him “Why are we here, in Japan?

The young officer replied “We are here to protect American interests and serve as a deterrent to the North Koreans and the Chinese and keep an eye on them.”

To that he replied “No, son. We’re here to keep an eye on the Japanese.

 

Remember that when considering the latest CIA spy revelations coming out of Germany.

#ThingsIkeNeverSaid: The D-Day Letter Eisenhower Never Had to Read Out Loud

 

Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower gives the order of the Day. "Full victory-nothing less" of the 101st Airborne Division in England, just before they board their airplanes to participate in the first assault in the D-Day invasion of Normandy.

Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower gives the order of the Day: “Full victory-nothing less.” to the 101st Airborne Division in England, just before they board their airplanes to participate in the first assault in the D-Day invasion of Normandy.

Peter Kouretsos — Today marks the 70th anniversary of the Allied invasion of Normandy that helped lead to the defeat of Nazi Germany.  “D-Day” as it is called now, was the largest amphibious military assault.  Ever.  Over 4,000 Allied soldiers died on the first day (To put that into perspective, the number of coalition soldiers killed in Afghanistan since 2001 totaled 3444 and 4,804 since 2003 in Iraq).  Many recall the letter General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander, wrote to each soldier participating in the invasion:

00763_2003_001.tif

And if you don’t feel like reading, here’s a recording of it:

I know. After an address like that, I’d be ready to go anywhere Ike told me to! But did you know that Eisenhower also wrote a note accepting blame for the possible failure of the D-Day landing? He never had to read it to the press, but he wrote it to himself the day before the invasion and kept it in his wallet just in case. As I’ve mentioned before, history has a way of sometimes taking on an air of inevitability; we have a tendency to look at past events and subconsciously accept that “this is the only way it could have happened.” Obama said the same thing today, “We say it now as if it couldn’t be any other way. But in the annals of history, the world had never seen anything like it.

And D-Day, one of the most celebrated military operations in world history that’s been lauded as tactical genius, the turning point in the War, the beginning of the end for the Nazis, could have gone down as one of the greatest military disasters in history. Read the letter for yourself:

“Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the Air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.”

“Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the Air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.”

Ike’s letter reveals that war planning, despite the most carefully crafted strategy, is still a precarious affair and carries with it a profound responsibility.  The invasion could have been a disaster, as the article I linked to above laid out. Ike could have blamed the weather.  Ike could have blamed the Generals under his command, tasked with carrying out the invasion: Bradley, Leigh-Mallory, Tedder, Dempsey, Ramsay or Monty.  Ike could have blamed the massive deception operations for not selling the fake invasion location better.  Instead, Ike blamed himself.

Ike scratched out “This particular operation” and instead wrote “My decision to attack.”  He acknowledged how much the outcome of the operation and the lives of those men he was sending out to execute the attack weighed on him. It’s one thing for an authority figure to sign a typewritten letter and quite another to write their own declaration of responsibility – before the outcome. I’ve only been alive for a little over two decades, but I’ve seen a lot of people blame others for failures that happened under their watch.  Ike’s letter revealed his character, and he represents a measure by which we ought to judge both past and future leadership.

Mexico & The United States: Challenges, Opportunities and Threats

With summer right around the corner and folks taking some vacation, Mexico is a popular spot. Matter of fact, my mother just went to a wedding at Los Cabos in Baja, California and my sister is going to Cancun for her honeymoon in a few weeks.  Mexico, and Latin America for that matter, was my “first [academic] love,” the first region that I delved into while studying International Relations. And surprisingly, I haven’t talked about Mexico at ALL.  This post then, is long overdue.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Mexico’s President Enrique Pena Nieto met at Los Pinos Presidential Residence in Mexico City on May 21, 2014

Secretary of State John Kerry has visited 48 countries and traveled almost 500,000 miles. But until he arrived in Mexico last Wednesday, he had not visited the United States’ closest neighbors, Mexico.

At first glance, Mexico has nothing going for it.  It has few navigable rivers and few good natural ports (Verazcruz is perhaps the best one).  To make matters worse, it has many disassociated territories, along with lots of highland jungle and deserts.  This in of itself may lead you to believe that it will never be a strong state.  It probably should be a failed state,  but thankfully, it’s nearest neighbor is the global superpower.  It has access to income and access to markets that it wouldn’t have had otherwise had it not been for their proximity to the United States.  More importantly for the purposes of this blog post, it has access to a drug consuming population that it wouldn’t have had otherwise.  Mexico has gone from an economic footnote, to perhaps the next big thing.  And by mid-century, the country will be stronger than ever.  Mexico is on track to becoming the next China.

Mexico’s Geographical Challenge:

Mexico has some of the worst types of terrain in which you can develop a successful economy and culture with.  Here, there are few areas where you don’t need irrigation, and unlike our chunks of arable land in the U.S., Mexico’s is much more dispersed.  None of these arable chunks of land in Mexico are connected.  That means any piece of infrastructure you build has to be built everywhere else, making it difficult to get any leverage.  The climate also make transport issues difficult.  As a result Mexico will always be capital poor with substandard infrastructure.

Land Use in Mexico Most of Mexico is highland or mountainous and less than 15% of the land is arable; about 25% of the country is forested. Dark Purple: Land suitable for intensive farming, has irrigation infrastructure. Light Purple: Farm with limited infrastructure for temporary/light farming. Gray: Limited farming, no irrigation infrastructure. Brown: Farm livestock, limited infrastructure. Light gray: Suitable for farm livestock or limited irrigation project. Yellow: With or without livestock limited infrastructure for livestock. Not suitable for farming. Green: Forest with limited or no infrastructure. Not suitable for farming.

The Good News (What does Mexico have going for it?):

Despite all of this, Mexico will be the fastest growing economy for the next three decades. Mexico is already the world’s 15th largest economy; in the next 20 years it’ll probably be in the top ten.  And that’s WITHOUT the drug war ending and WITHOUT having a corrupt government.  There are certain things that are just hardwired into the system.  Right now, monkeys can run Mexico and it will probably end up the same way.

The United States has tripled its natural gas exports to Mexico in the last decade, and we’re going to triple that again in the next four years.  There are 9 trunk-lines under construction right now with an target completion date of 2017.  Texas won’t just be feeding Juarez with energy; pretty soon it will be powering Mexico City and Veracruz. Thank you, shale. And this is all without the recent reforms that Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto signed into law that changes the constitution to allow foreign companies to drill for oil and gas.

Mexico also has favorable demographics, with lots of young workers and a large consumption base, largely propelled by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  And as horrible and violent as the drug war has been, it has pushed down Mexican labor costs; they are now cheaper than China’s.  Anywhere else in the world this wouldn’t work very well, but because they are so close to the U.S. this labor differential works in their favor.  The bigger that differential is, the more investors look at Mexico and see it as an attractive market to leverage its labor capacities to service the American market.  So I know this sounds crazy, but the worse the drug war gets in Mexico, the better it is for FDI. Foreigners can come in, metabolize the cheap labor, and sell things to the U.S. because of it.  This is the second largest bilateral economic relationship in human history.  By 2020 I expect it to be the largest.  As of right now the Mexican-American border is already the most crossed border in human history; last year it had 350 million legal border crossings.  It’s not that the Americans haven’t decided if we want to integrate with Mexico, it’s that we don’t know what to do about it yet.

The blue areas are the largest concentrations of Hispanic populations. While this map is telling, not in this map are the %increases of Hispanics which are over 50% almost all across the United States.

The Bad News (You Can’t Spell “Mexico” Without “Drug war”):

The Mexicans are the only people in the world who can WALK to the United States. In every country you have cultures that can physically transport themselves and set up ghettos en masse.  Here, we only have Mexicans and Central Americans; all of our ghetto populations are Hispanic.  That complicates things a little, since drug runners started entering the United States through Mexico after we effectively cut off their transit routes to Miami via the Caribbean.  The problem is when the ghetto issue and the drug transport issues coalesce.

Mexico’s land border with the US is 2,000 miles long. Even if the US put all of its troops on the border right now, that’s only 1 for every 50 feet.

We are seeing signs of this coalescence, as well as the TCOs’ diversification and expansion. Just last week, New York City officials seized over 50 pounds of heroin that dealers were attempting to move from New England.  Yes, New York City.  The flood of heroin coming in and out of New York City has surged to its highest levels since 1991, alarming law enforcement who say that bigger players – like Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (“TCOs)– are now entering the market.

You know them as “drug cartels” but I call them TCOs because they have diversified; they are not just drug-running cartels anymore.  They’ve gone UP the supply chain to South America and contracted directly with the cocoa producers.  And now they’re coming DOWN the supply chain to the United States.  They can move anything now: drugs, money, guns, people, even oil.  See, these “cartel wars” are not necessarily about drugs; they’re about transport routes and networks. It’s about geography.  The logical conclusion is that this “drug war” will spill over into the United States as they fight each other for these networks.  And in many ways it already has.  Mexican TCOs are now the dominant organized crime group in 1,000 municipalities and operate in more than 230 American cities, from San Diego to Boston.

And because we don’t have an immigration policy to integrate these ghetto populations, we’ve provided the cartels with exactly what they need to spread.  And they are kicking the American gangs’ asses.  In ten years time the current U.S. gangs – the Bloods and the Crips just won’t exist anymore, because the TCOs will have killed them all.  They will take over retail drug distribution.  And then they will begin fighting each other, just as they have been in Mexico.

We are worried about Syria, Ukraine and Afghanistan, but are we prepared for Mexican TCOs infiltrating the Spanish speaking ghettos in every major city and bringing the North American drug war here?  This is something I don’t think we can fuhgettabout.

The Forgotten Games During the “Forgotten War”: The 1952 Pyuktong Inter Camp Olympics

We all know the North Koreans have a thing for the theatrics.  Heated rhetoric comes from them all the time.  In fact, just the other day, North Korean state media referred to Obama as a “monkey” and the South Korean President as an “old prostitute.”  This rhetoric, coupled with the long history of escapades, like the satellite launch in 2012, firing rockets into the sea and thereby restarting Caligula’s ancient war with Poseidon, and constant threats of nuclear testing, has long been used by the North Korean leaders to bolster their regime internally. Defying the great enemy that is the West, despite decades of international isolation and hardship is a North Korean pastime.  But this is nothing new; North Korea and even their northern neighbors, the People’s Republic of China (China/PRC) have a long history of capitalizing on issues and events to use as propaganda to bolster their governments.

The camp teams battled it out in track-and-field events, soccer, boxing, and wrestling, as well as American football, and softball.

During the Cold War, both North Korea and China made great efforts to convey that they were great countries to live in, perhaps even a paradise.  During the Korean War in particular, they tried to deflect accusations from the international community that their U.N. prisoners were being mistreated.  Most people remember that the first Olympic Games held on the Korean peninsula were in Seoul, in the summer of 1988, but they are mistaken. After the official 1952 Summer Olympics were held in Helsinki, Finland in July, North Korea and the PRC created an alternative Olympic Games at a North Korean POW camp in Pyuktong.  Prison camps near the Yalu River in North Korea competed in teams made up of men from the United States, Britain, South Korea, Turkey, France, the Philippines, and the Netherlands. The camp teams battled it out in track-and-field events, soccer, boxing, and wrestling, as well as American football, and softball, all during the harsh North Korean winter. It would have many names, but it would be known as the Inter Camp Olympics. The Korean War has been dubbed the “Forgotten War,” but even those that remember it are not aware of this bizarre event.  This is an obscure, yet fascinating event during the Korean War with which there is so little information.

Many studies of POWs during the Korean War include the infamous Clarence Adams, an African American POW from Memphis, Tennessee.  He was one of the twenty-one Americans who decided to start a new life and live in the PRC, refusing repatriation after the armistice (yes, we’re still technically at war with North Korea).(1)  His motives and experiences in China are often the most cited, but no one to my knowledge has ever cited his participation in the POW Olympics.  He was in Camp 5, one of the several camps that participated in the games.  We are aware of the death marches, the torture, and the poor treatment of POWs committed by the North Koreans in the early years of the war; Adams recalled how he weighed roughly 100 pounds.  However, he observed that treatment improved after the Chinese took over their camp:

The Chinese took over Camp 5 in the spring of 1951 and introduced what they called their “lenient policy.” They lined us all up and told us that although they were not bound by the Geneva Convention, they had their own policy of leniency that would greatly improve our lives in the camp…and gradually it did. (2)

Adams cited the racial discrimination he and fellow African Americans faced as a major reason for staying on in a new socialist country. He ended up returning to the U.S., fleeing China during the Cultural Revolution.

The treatment of POWs in the North somewhat improved when the peace talks at Panmunjom started, when the Chinese adopted their “lenient policy.” From his account we learn that the Chinese were fairly reasonable in providing POWs with some level of comfort and normalcy, but it is unclear as to whether this is genuine, given that their new policy started right around the peace talks. Adams records that the Chinese:

…agreed to everything I asked for.  After a couple of months, they brought in bats and baseballs, footballs, books, boxing gloves, parallel bars…We set up cooking and sanitation committees. We exercised every day. And the guys began to get stronger.  We even got some medicine that we gave to the prisoners who were medics to administer… (3)

Along with beginning to see conditions improving in the camp, Adams is the only American POW that I found that definitively recorded the Inter Camp Olympics in a printed memoir:

A welcome interlude occurred in our daily lives with the Inter Camp P.O.W. Olympics, held in November 15-27, 1952, in Pyuktong, just outside of Camp 5. This was a time of heated negotiations, and the Chinese obviously hoped to gain positive worldwide publicity for hosting these games.  Some prisoners refused to participate, but others…welcomed this diversion from the tedium of their daily lives, as well as the chance to talk to their buddies from other camps. (4)

Adams observed that several hundred POWs participated and competed in many sports, including “football, baseball, softball, basketball, volleyball, track and field, soccer, gymnastics, and of course boxing, where I fought as a lightweight.”  We learn earlier in his memoir that he was an avid boxer. He must have been thrilled to be able to box competitively again, perhaps a reason why he never viewed the event in a negative light.  From his recollection we learn that the Chinese put on quite a show, and tried to make it as grandiose and organized as possible: “We had our own photographers, announcers, and even reporters who put out a newspaper called the “Olympic Roundup” after each day’s events…It was great fun and made us forget about where we were for at least a few days.” (5)

Adams mentioned a newspaper called “Olympic Roundup” that was printed at the camp during the games, which brought me to a treasure of a website that I intend to continue analyzing in the future.   Its contents include a brochure/pamphlet that was produced, courtesy of the People’s Republic of China, shortly after the Inter Camp Olympics; the extent to which it was distributed is unknown, but its contents were scanned and copied onto this website, courtesy of a group of British Korean War veterans.(6) The pamphlet includes a wealth of information, ranging from pictures of the sporting events and ceremonies, and every piece of information is straight from “Olympic Roundup,” which was written by the POWs covering the games.  In the records of participants it lists Clarence Adams as one of the 22 competitors (with their serial numbers) in the boxing tournament. Pictures from the newspaper are also shown, and some the clippings described the significance of the event:

…I can say that in all the history of prisoner-of-war life, this sort of thing never happened before…it was the most colorful and gala event to come about during our stay here in Korea under the guidance of our captors…I am certain that no one in his sane mind will ever say that prisoners of war here are not the best cared for in the whole world today.  May the peoples all the world over be informed of that First Inter-Camp Olympics Meet, 1952…

Another one goes further: “…It’s a pity, that the same atmosphere doesn’t prevail over all the world, because if so then how pleasant and peaceful life would be for us all.”  The purpose of this pamphlet, like any pamphlet, was for distribution.  However, discerning the audience is difficult; Since this is one of the only surviving records of such a piece, it is possible that it was distributed as a souvenir for POWs to take back home. It is also not clear if it was distributed in China, or if they were flown and dropped over U.N. territory to convince Western troops how much fun their POW friends were having while they were freezing in a foxhole.

The irony in all of this of course is that everyone who participated in this event, from those you see smiling and competing with each other in sports uniforms (see pictures at the end), to those that wrote and recorded the event in the newspaper, were captives. The writing in the newspapers that were meant for distribution is full of praise, to convince participants that maybe the Communist governments were not so bad after all.(7)  The general consensus is that the event was used as a propaganda ploy, and participants had to have been well aware of this.  In a paper written to describe life in POW camps for Marines during the War, Colonel James Angus MacDonald mentions the Games in a few pages (out of several hundred). In it he quotes an Air Force pilot who described a Major Thomas D. Harrison, who I was able to cross-reference with the pamphlet website and confirm that he played basketball as a participant in the Olympics:

…he attended  an athletic meet in Pyoktong. While there, his skill as an athlete helped restore the prestige of the officers torn down by the enemy’s propaganda.  In addition he defied the guards by circulating among the enlisted men and pointing out lies contained in the enemy propaganda designed to slander this country…at the same time he collected the names of many prisoners held in isolated places whom it was suspected that the enemy might attempt to hold after the end of the war. (8)

It’s no surprise that we learned about the considerable efforts made by the Chinese to indoctrinate younger enlisted men.(9)  After fielding several interviews with which he provides no transcript, Colonel MacDonald also described the discernment process that other POW Camps went through before finally deciding to participate in these Olympics.  He concluded that normally they would have withdrew their participation, due to the potential the event had for being used as propaganda, but “…in the end, the possibility for making contact with other camps and exchanging vital information proved the deciding factor.”(10)  This corroborates with Clarence Adam’s testimony earlier when he mentioned that it was a way for prisoners at other camps to see their buddies.

In November 1952, in the region of Pyoktong in North Korea, hundreds of United Nations prisoners captured during two years of fighting were brought together to compete in the “Inter Camp Olympics.”  But who could blame prisoners for participating in such an event? Regardless if the whole thing was used for propaganda, in a way, everyone got what they wanted.  Furthermore, it wouldn’t exactly be untrue if a majority of the captives enjoyed it. The fact that they were able to compete in physically strenuous events suggests that they were indeed treated at least with some level of nourishment.  The extent to which the Communists were able to convert prisoners to their cause was only limited to the likes of Clarence Adams, who were halfway there since they had their grievances about their home country prior to serving as an Allied combatant.  The Chinese and North Koreans could say that they were treating the captives well, and the POWs got a chance to see their comrades and live in better conditions for 2 weeks. For the POWs, this was a valuable diversion to the morale-draining prisoner life.  In short, it was a fantasy for both parties involved.

Two years ago was not only the year of the 2012 Summer Olympics at London; that November also marked the 60th anniversary of these Inter Camp Olympics. And although the Korean War is a dim memory in much of the world today, perhaps a detailed account of  a Communist propaganda exercise, their answer to the real Olympics Games and indeed, one of the strangest events ever to have occurred during wartime, will spark a renewed interest in the conflict whose consequences reverberate on the Peninsula and beyond to this day.

—————————————————————————————–

Pictures obtained from various pages of <http://www.kmike.com/POW_Olympics/pow/index.htm&gt;

(1)  Clarence Adams. An American Dream: The Life of an African American Soldier and POW Who Spent Twelve Years in Communist China. Ed. Della Adams and Lewis H. Carlson. Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2007. Print.

Their defection was regarded as a major public relations victory for the Communists, but Adams never considered himself a turncoat. We can sympathize with him in the sense that he knew that there would be no life for him back in the States; he was a poor black man who would inevitably return to the 1950s South. Eventually he abandoned his life in China and returned to the U.S.

(2)  Ibid., 51.

(3) Ibid., 56. We must take Adams words here with some level of suspicion.  We learn in his memoir that the found Chinese re-education classes given at his camp compelling, and he was a regular contributor to their propaganda newspaper. As a representative of the camp, perhaps the Chinese thought that if they worked with Adams and gave him some authority he would be swayed to come to their side.  Although he never says this outright, his defection points to this being a possibility.

(4)  Ibid., 62.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Michael White. “Index to 1952 POW Olympics.” Index to 1952 POW Olympics. Web. 19 Nov. 2012. <http://www.kmike.com/POW_Olympics/pow/index.htm&gt;

(7) Culturally, although they abandoned some of their old ways in favor of Communism, the Confucian ideology stresses to never express your true intentions and emotions outright, and if you must, to do it ever so subtly.

(8) James A.MacDonald, Jr. The Problems of U.S. Marine Corps Prisoners of War in Korea. Thesis. History And Museum Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps Washington, D.C., 1962, 195. <http://www.koreanwar2.org/kwp2/usmckorea/reference/usmcpowkorea.pdf&gt;

(9) Historical records show that these subversive activities were not only done by the Chinese themselves, but by Western prisoners like Clarence Adams who were labeled as “Progressives” and were sympathetic to the criticisms of their own country.

(10) MacDonald, 195.

 

The Past is the Future with the Lights On: “What should we be thinking about for the war after next?”

 

It’s pretty obvious that Americans are uncomfortable about the U.S. getting into wars. They think Vietnam.  They think Afghanistan; that one was supposed to be “the good war.”  They think Iraq.  No more “war[s] on terror” please. But Americans have always been uncomfortable about getting into wars.  Yet, last May, Pentagon officials testified to Congress that keeping the AUMF in place is important to facilitate the ongoing “war on terrorism,” which will last “at least ten to twenty [more] years.”  Shortly thereafter, President Obama said in a speech at the NDU that it’s time for the United States to get off the trajectory of perpetual-war.  What gives? One thing you learn when studying History is that although the discipline itself deals with how things change over time, you come across many things that really don’t change all that much.  And while it’s true that we haven’t had a “great power” war in a long time, 1) we’ve had some pretty close calls, 2) we shouldn’t completely rule it out, and 3) even when we adopted this mentality by gutting our forces after the Cold War, we exposed ourselves to the other side of the conflict pendulum: the non-state actor.  We got caught flat-footed and here we are today.  With this in mind, here are some things to think about when thinking about what “future wars” will look like:

Many future wars will be fought off the backs of pickup trucks, dubbed “technicals.” Unlike tanks and heavy armor which are owned by the government, every rebel commander knows that all you’ve got to do is grab a Toyota pickup, strap on some military hardware, pile the back up with volunteers and speed off to the front line. Cheap, mobile, replaceable. What’s not to like?

I.  One thing that won’t change is struggles with insurgents and guerrillas; and neither will struggles with terrorist groups like al Qaeda.  After all, we may learn about the big “important” wars in History, with pitched battles and uniformed and organized armies, where one side wins and the other side loses, but a closer look of most of humanity’s violent conflicts have been smaller, prolonged, guerilla-like campaigns (Max Boot’s new book goes into great detail about this).  There is a spectrum of course; we can’t completely rule out the high intensity conflicts between nation-states, but a majority of conflicts will happen under the latter.   As for the AUMF, still in place and unchanged for over a decade, it will probably stick around for some time.  Those 60 words are too politically expedient to scrap altogether, but it will probably be reworked in the future, as it gives the Executive Branch extraordinary powers to handle the reality of the future of war: that wars have and will continue to take a really long time.  All guerrilla campaigns do. And so will counter-terrorism, which has been used synonymously with “war.”  A popular saying among Afghans when we invaded was, “You have all the watches, but we have all the time.” It’s pretty amazing how during the worst months of Vietnam, 2,000 soldiers died every month, but in this century running two wars at the same time in Iraq and Afghanistan, it took years to reach that level.  Fewer casualties can also mean a higher tolerance for pain, and therefore a higher tolerance for prolonged conflict, since it takes longer for the casualties to amass. It will also become increasingly uncertain as to what actually defines victory.  The war may be over for us, but will it necessarily always be over for the other guy?

Most of the world’s largest major cities and population centers are by the water. The United States Navy conveniently has a naval presence in every major body of water in the world. Littoral operations deploying from Carrier Battle Groups and allied ports are something that’s been done in the past and will continue to be done in the future, so long as there are oceans with people on the coasts.  The Marine Corps will be happy to be operating closer to their littoral roots, especially after fighting in landlocked deserts for over a decade.

II.   A second thing that won’t really change is geography. Geography should be a mainstay when thinking about the future of war, as it will determine where they will take place; and in the future, those places will overwhelmingly be in coastal cities and their immediate surroundings.  If current estimates that say 80% of the world’s population lives roughly within 60 miles of the coast are true, war will take on an increasingly littoral character.  And since a majority of the world’s cities, even in the developing world, are on or close to the world’s shorelines, war will take on an increasingly urban character too.  Yes, Kabul and Baghdad were “cities,” but imagine trying to do what we did there in a place like Mumbai, Cairo, Sao Paulo or Karachi. Surprisingly, the “developing world” has the majority of mega cities, with populations over 8,000,000 (that’s not accounting for undeclared residents and the suburbs). David Kilcullen reflects on his experience in Baghdad as a COIN advisor during the Iraq War:

We shut the city down. We brought in more than 100 kilometers of concrete T-wall. We put troops on every street corner. We got alongside people and try to make them feel safe. It was very, you know, sort of human intense and equipment intense. That option will not be open for us in the mega city. You won’t be able to do that in Karachi or just obviously, hypothetical examples, Lagos or Dakar or any of the big cities. There are 20 million people…

Enormous populations, weak governance and unresponsive institutions, growing inequality; all of this and more is a petri dish for trouble that can develop significant momentum and spiral into something else altogether.  This does not include the threat of rising sea levels, drought and famine, all of which are now grabbing the attention of Defense planners.

III.  Wars in the future will be littoral, urban and prolonged.  But many of them will also be “shadow wars.”  The post-9/11 counterterrorism model of intelligence-driven operations by multi-agency task forces around the globe will persist; the two snatch-and-grab operations by JSOC just hours apart in Somalia and Libya demonstrate that this war did not end with the killing of Osama bin Laden.  In fact, on the night of the bin Laden raid, special-operations forces based in Afghanistan alone conducted a dozen other missions with similar objectives.  Clandestine and covert operations go back to the Ancient Greeks, but with the technology we have today it’s going to get even easier to involve ourselves in conflicts, some of which we will claim responsibility for and others not at all.  Indeed, in light of the public’s general distaste for war, Defense brass will have to get more creative in how to wage it.   Our conventional dominance will continue to force adversaries to get more creative in their approaches to how they challenge us and our partners.  After all, why should they play our game?  Any formidable adversary will try to employ means to target our weaknesses and minimize our advantages.  Ramping up Special Operations, drone strikes, proxy-wars, cyber-warfare; all of those structures are here to stay, and they’ll only get more sophisticated and lethal.  Sun Tzu, the strategic sage, never limited war to the conventional battlefield; and if things like cyber-attacks and UAVs were at his disposal, he surely would have found a place for them in his maxims.

In the wars of the future, sometimes our presence will be acknowledged, sometimes it won’t. But in the Information Age, you’ll know it when you see it, even if it’s just a shadow.

IV.  Finally, another thing to keep in mind: war will always be rife with unintended consequences.  Von Moltke the Elder said “No battle plan ever survives contact with the enemy,” essentially the modern version of that Mike Tyson quote: “Everybody has a plan until you get punched in the mouth.”  You can tell yourself “The war will be over by Christmas” and plan for short, decisive engagements, but not every war is Desert Storm.  Working off of von Moltke, defense planners and decision makers will have to be flexible and adaptable.  The days when the U.S. can pick and choose its wars are coming to an end.  We have annual defense and intelligence assessments, battle plans, the works, but every now and then you’re going to get it wrong.  You have to be able to commit to a strategy, but be able to come up with something completely different if the circumstances require it.  We need to be balanced and flexible enough to deal with groups with increasingly advanced capabilities like other nation-states, while also keeping an eye on the non-state actors.  Doubling down on deterring a potential peer competitor (or an increasingly confrontational former peer competitor) without leaving yourself vulnerable to a lower-end confrontation will be a challenge.  Additionally, elements of future conflicts will be roboticized, and technology is certainly a force-multiplier, but let’s not kid ourselves and remove the human role from war and conflict.  Manpower will continue to play an important role in war and nothing will replace the good old-fashioned “on the ground” intelligence, or HUMINT.  The 9/11 attacks were [in part] an unintended consequence of gutting HUMINT during the Bush Sr. and Clinton years; with the end of the Cold War the conventional thinking at the time was that we couldn’t justify this large military and intelligence apparatus.  On the flipside the attacks were an unintended consequence of too much HUMINT, as we supported bin Laden and the mujahedeen in 1970s Afghanistan.  Clearly, a balance can be struck, but it seems we prefer the pendulum method instead: either too much, or not enough.

Technically speaking, the future of war won’t be “bloodier,” since our laser blasters and lightsabers will cauterize the wounds they make, so you know, actually less blood.  But as the saying goes, “The more things change, the more things stay the same.”  War will continue to be war.  But as we find newer ways to kill each other, the above-mentioned thoughts will hopefully ground us in certain realities that aren’t really new at all, but are less emphasized or forgotten.  But the past is only the future with the lights on; it’s best to look back for some insight we can use in the years ahead.

Double-edged Sword: What implications – if any, would the growth of nuclear power have for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons?

Peter Kouretsos – – – Given the growing concerns about global warming and energy security, many states are interested in either expanding their nuclear power or acquiring it if they do not already possess it.  The International Energy Outlook 2013 projects that world energy consumption will grow by 56% between now and 2040; nuclear power is still expected to play an important role in that energy mix, even with the continued development of existing fossil fuel technology and renewables.  In fact, according to the IAEA there are some 30 states operating nuclear power reactors, and some 40 states have asked for assistance in starting their own, even after the 2011 disaster at Fukushima.  But this so called “Nuclear Renaissance” is a double-edged sword.  Nuclear facilities that can make fuel for peaceful reactors can also produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon.  And with the demand for nuclear power comes the risk of further nuclear weapons proliferation.  The challenge ahead of us then is to maintain the peaceful and transparent growth of civilian nuclear power.  The outcome will depend on which states acquire nuclear power and which mechanisms are put into place that can constrain the weapons-side of nuclear power while not hindering its civilian-side.

These 30 states already operate nuclear power plants and 40 more want help with starting up their own programs.

Scott Sagan from Stanford has correlated the system of a state’s government to its compliance under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  He found that most autocracies that were signatories of the NPT developed nuclear weapons programs after they signed it.  Why they “cheat” depends on factors exclusive to those states, but he found that this is not characteristic of Democracies.  As an international framework that is meant to be as inclusive as possible, the NPT does not discriminate against any system of government.  However, special attention should be paid to non-democracies that acquire nuclear power, as their institutions and decision-making processes are often more opaque, making them more unpredictable.

Countries with pervasive corruption are more likely to have fissile material “mysteriously” disappear. Transparency International comes out with an annual Corruption Perceptions Index, identifying which countries abuse power, engage in secret dealings, you know, corrupt things like that.

An expansion of nuclear power would create more risks for proliferation, as the number of people, installations, infrastructure nodes and transportation requirements increase.  A key thread that can link vulnerabilities in all of these variables is corruption.  Of the 177 countries surveyed in the latest Corruptions Perception Index, less than 1/3 scored above 50 out of a possible 100.  Many of those states operate nuclear power facilities, and some are even nuclear-weapons states.  Of the states that intend on pursuing a nuclear program in the near future, more than half scored in the bottom percentile.  The AQ Khan network in Pakistan is a prime example of how a state’s pervasive corruption can hinder counter proliferation efforts.  We still do not know the full extent to whom he helped nor the extent to which he helped them, but we are still dealing with the global fallout caused by this nuclear scientist.  As we spread nuclear power around the world, we must be wary of states with pervasive corruption, as it increases the likelihood for theft of fissile material and affects the severity with which nuclear security measures are executed.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the creator of Pakistan’s first nuclear bomb, was also the largest single proliferator of nuclear weapons technology and know-how. He has been linked to the advances in nuclear technology in North Korea, Libya and Iran. His associates also met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. He is hailed as a national hero to this day, and upon learning about the bin Laden raid in Abbottabad, the Pakistani government sent the military to Dr. Khan’s compound. They thought we were coming for him too.

An article  from Foreign Affairs some time ago gives a nod to Bernard Baruch, warning in 1946 that the line between “safe” and “dangerous” (proliferative) nuclear activities would change and need constant reexamination.  Perhaps the current global expansion of nuclear energy warrants a redrawing of this line. Indeed, a contentious issue is what the actual definition of “right to enrich” in Article IV of the NPT means.  Iran is the most popular example of navigating this discrepancy, but even South Korea, a U.S. ally, is making a push for domestic enrichment capability.  For many countries, this is seen as an important step in developing their nuclear industries, as well as a mark of national sovereignty.  If it is indeed a sovereign right for all states to acquire nuclear power, we all must ensure that the reactors and fuels used are properly safeguarded and 100% accounted for. Provided that signatories from here on out accept certain limits on enrichment and accept enhanced safeguards, the risk of proliferation can be mitigated.  In order to further curb these risks, the growth of nuclear power makes worldwide adoption of the Additional Protocol to the NPT a necessity.  A first step we could take is to prohibit any new country acquiring nuclear power to begin their program until they adopt the NPT with the Additional Protocol. Certainly more rules and regulations imply a lack of trust, but when it comes to this potentially destructive technology, “trust, but verify” ought to be at the top of our lexicon.

Though there is a correlation between the growth of civilian nuclear power and the risk of further proliferation, this does not make proliferation a certainty.  Civilian nuclear facilities can give states cover to develop nuclear weapons capabilities, but the political and economic motives to pursue such a weapon will likely be the primary instigators. To be sure, factors like deterrence theory, domestic politics and great-power ambitions have played a role in the decision of some states to acquire nuclear weapons; but the majority of states with nuclear power have refrained from this acquisition.  To further influence these decisions, the U.S. and other powers should make it clear to all that the costs of acquiring a weapon will outweigh the benefits, while they themselves continue to demonstrate “good faith” under the NPT by leading a reinvigorated movement towards nuclear disarmament.

Who has what when it comes to nuclear weapons, at a glance.

Most of all, in order to curb the proliferation risks that come with the growth of nuclear energy, one more thing will be required of individual states, that each with their own individual interests, deplore: cooperation.  This is especially true when countering nuclear terrorism, something that cannot always be dealt with by IAEA inspectors or conventional theories of deterrence.  The one thing we can control is access to fissile material; and all states that possess any facility containing it should have to accept more intrusive control measures and inspection procedures than they do today.  T.S. Eliot remarked that sometimes people “…dream[ing] up of systems so perfect that no one will need to be good.”  If he was correct, then the greatest implication of spreading nuclear power will have to be vigilance.

Misunderestimating Thucydides: Why Crime[a] and Punishment for Russia will only get the West so far

Whenever I’m perplexed after reading something in the news, I typically turn to a much older set of papers for some context and sometimes, for some inspiration. As told by Thucydides:

The good faith, Lacedaemonians, which characterizes your political conduct and private intercourse towards each other, makes you the less disposed to hearken to what may be said to the prejudice of others; and from this, indeed, you derive a sober-minded moderation, but you labour always under a great misconception of the affairs of other States.

Thucydides was recounting the Corinthians’ address to the Spartan Senate, where they were comparing the Spartans with the Athenians. To the Corinthians, Sparta assumes that since they have a working constitution and a way of life that suits them well, they do not have to change their ways to confront this new issue: the growth of Athenian power. While this attitude is seen as being “moderate,” the Corinthians point out that this shows a kind of ignorance when it comes to foreign affairs.

Whether this account of the Corinthians addressing the Spartan Senate is 100% accurate or not is inconsequential. What it reveals though, is a recurring pattern in History: States and their leaders, try as they may, often misunderstand or do not consider the goals, actions and intentions of other States and their leaders. What does this have to do with Russia?

The idea that allowing the Russians to hold onto the Crimea suggests some huge decline in American power is strange, considering that in 1989, the United States’ power only reached as far as Bavaria; and if you look at the map below this one, you'll see that it now surrounds Russia on almost all sides.

The idea that allowing the Russians to hold onto the Crimea suggests some huge decline in American power is strange, considering that in 1989, the United States’ power only reached as far as Bavaria; and if you look at the map below this one, you’ll see that it now surrounds Russia on almost all sides.

Post Cold War

Voice: “Knock knock”
Putin: “Who’s there?”
Voice: “NATO”

We’ve treated the Russians as a potential threat since the 90s. We’ve expanded NATO to its doorstep, and we’re working on building missile defense systems in Eastern Europe, all to their protest.  And then comes Ukraine, where the U.S. and a coalition of Western governments backed and encouraged protesters that led to the overthrow of a sitting president that kept close ties with Russia, which was soon replaced by an interim government hostile to Russia.  What did Putin think about all of that?  Could this happen to his own government; was Kyiv a dress rehearsal for Moscow?  I suppose you’ll have to ask Putin himself, but it’s likely that he at least entertained the thought.

You’d expect American policymakers to at least try to understand Russian concerns about Ukraine joining an alliance with traditionally adversarial powers (i.e. greater cooperation with the E.U. and NATO). Obama pundits have made the argument that the President invited this crisis in Ukraine because he didn’t take a firmer stance on Syria and chose to pull out of Iraq.  This is absolutely ridiculous.  Even if Obama had bombed Syria, he still would be faced with this situation in Ukraine, and he would have been holding the same cards.  Perhaps pundits forget that the last President’s “firm stance,” a rapid expansion of the National Security state and invading two countries, did not stop Putin from invading Georgia.   Russia’s move in Georgia in ’08 and Crimea today is understandable if you accept that most powers do not like hostile governments on their borders and that most powers are always looking to maintain or grow their sphere of influence.  After all, the United States is deeply committed to the Monroe Doctrine, which warns other great powers to stay out of the Western Hemisphere, or else.  Like how Canada and Mexico are to us, Georgia and Ukraine aren’t just any states close to Russia’s neighborhood; they’re on its doorstep.  Over here, we live in a country with the Atlantic to our West, the Pacific to our East, Mexico at the bottom and Canada at the top.  That’s geography, and it’s not changing.  We have it pretty good over here.  If you’re Russia though, with Germany and NATO on one side, China on the other, and Japan breathing down your neck, it’s a different story altogether.

So the polls are in and we moved to another stage of this Crimean crisis: the Crimean Parliament declared independence from Ukraine, 97% of Crimean voters favored joining Russia, the Parliament formally asked Russia to join the Russian Federation, and the Kremlin signed legislation sealing the deal. Crimea is gone.  Whatever comes next, we have few options to “punish” Russia, at least in the short term, and Putin knows it.

For one, the Europeans aren’t super excited about “crippling” sanctions; London and Cyrpus really like all of that Russian money in its banking system, and from what I’ve gathered, major arteries that feed Europe’s natural gas supply flow through Ukraine, from Russia.  And all of the Western governments are trying to pass legislation to secure a bailout for Ukraine, but when has our Congress ever agreed on anything, especially when right now we’re looking for things to cut, not add to, the deficit?   And if the history of sanctions has taught us anything, it’s that regimes are willing to endure a tremendous amount of pain to secure what they see as their vital interests.

Germany relies on Russia for three-quarters of its oil and gas imports.  Sanctions on Russia could be painful for everyone.

Germany relies on Russia for three-quarters of its oil and gas imports. Sanctions on Russia could be painful for everyone.

That doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t implement the tools that we have and are willing to use.  But it seems to me there’s little we can do about Russia’s annexation of Crimea.  Economic sanctions?  Installing missile defense systems in Eastern Europe?  Seizing assets of Putin’s friends?  Giving the Ukrainians foreign aid [and who aren’t exactly innocent in this affair, and are only united by their hatred for Yanukovych and Putin]?  Go for it.  But the reality is we’re not going to war over Crimea, and Obama has publicly stated that we will not go to war over Ukraine.

Don’t get me wrong; I’m not saying Russia is “back.”  Mitt Romney’s comment on Russia being America’s “number one geopolitical foe” falls short (but Obama was also wrong to snub him the way that he did).   This is not to say that Russia doesn’t matter, but let’s not give them too much credit: Russia may be playing geopolitical chess, but he’s playing defense.  This move in Crimea was a move made from weakness.   Ukraine has slowly been moving away from Russia, and inching toward the West.   The West hasn’t lost Ukraine.  Europe hasn’t lost Ukraine.  The United States hasn’t lost Ukraine.  Putin lost Ukraine, and he knows it.   So to save face he took a short term gain (Crimea, and saber rattling towards Eastern Ukraine) but a long term loss, and Russian influence over the rest of Europe will suffer.

Formal Ukrainian elections are going to be held in May, and it’s unlikely that any new government will be a Yanukovych; but that doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be respectful to its [Russian] minorities and nudge Russia on with provocative gestures.   The reality is that the stability of Ukraine cannot be guaranteed with at least some level of cooperation with Russia.   After all, Ukraine is “the borderland.”  Point is, we can talk about punishing Russia all we want, but decent relations with Moscow are imperative.  We need their help with Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, and soon, maybe even China. Anyone who thinks this is just about Ukraine has to stop thinking like a lawyer and more like a strategist.  Thucydides would’ve understood that.

Sidenote: Though the current crisis in Ukraine is complex, we should remember that everything can always be worse.   As per an agreement signed in Budapest in 1994, Ukraine has gotten rid of all their nuclear weapons, and just two years ago eliminated all of their weapons-grade materiel.  A document signed 20 years ago prevented this from becoming a nuclear crisis. And now that’s one less thing we have to think about.