Double-edged Sword: What implications – if any, would the growth of nuclear power have for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons?

Peter Kouretsos – – – Given the growing concerns about global warming and energy security, many states are interested in either expanding their nuclear power or acquiring it if they do not already possess it.  The International Energy Outlook 2013 projects that world energy consumption will grow by 56% between now and 2040; nuclear power is still expected to play an important role in that energy mix, even with the continued development of existing fossil fuel technology and renewables.  In fact, according to the IAEA there are some 30 states operating nuclear power reactors, and some 40 states have asked for assistance in starting their own, even after the 2011 disaster at Fukushima.  But this so called “Nuclear Renaissance” is a double-edged sword.  Nuclear facilities that can make fuel for peaceful reactors can also produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon.  And with the demand for nuclear power comes the risk of further nuclear weapons proliferation.  The challenge ahead of us then is to maintain the peaceful and transparent growth of civilian nuclear power.  The outcome will depend on which states acquire nuclear power and which mechanisms are put into place that can constrain the weapons-side of nuclear power while not hindering its civilian-side.

These 30 states already operate nuclear power plants and 40 more want help with starting up their own programs.

Scott Sagan from Stanford has correlated the system of a state’s government to its compliance under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  He found that most autocracies that were signatories of the NPT developed nuclear weapons programs after they signed it.  Why they “cheat” depends on factors exclusive to those states, but he found that this is not characteristic of Democracies.  As an international framework that is meant to be as inclusive as possible, the NPT does not discriminate against any system of government.  However, special attention should be paid to non-democracies that acquire nuclear power, as their institutions and decision-making processes are often more opaque, making them more unpredictable.

Countries with pervasive corruption are more likely to have fissile material “mysteriously” disappear. Transparency International comes out with an annual Corruption Perceptions Index, identifying which countries abuse power, engage in secret dealings, you know, corrupt things like that.

An expansion of nuclear power would create more risks for proliferation, as the number of people, installations, infrastructure nodes and transportation requirements increase.  A key thread that can link vulnerabilities in all of these variables is corruption.  Of the 177 countries surveyed in the latest Corruptions Perception Index, less than 1/3 scored above 50 out of a possible 100.  Many of those states operate nuclear power facilities, and some are even nuclear-weapons states.  Of the states that intend on pursuing a nuclear program in the near future, more than half scored in the bottom percentile.  The AQ Khan network in Pakistan is a prime example of how a state’s pervasive corruption can hinder counter proliferation efforts.  We still do not know the full extent to whom he helped nor the extent to which he helped them, but we are still dealing with the global fallout caused by this nuclear scientist.  As we spread nuclear power around the world, we must be wary of states with pervasive corruption, as it increases the likelihood for theft of fissile material and affects the severity with which nuclear security measures are executed.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the creator of Pakistan’s first nuclear bomb, was also the largest single proliferator of nuclear weapons technology and know-how. He has been linked to the advances in nuclear technology in North Korea, Libya and Iran. His associates also met with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. He is hailed as a national hero to this day, and upon learning about the bin Laden raid in Abbottabad, the Pakistani government sent the military to Dr. Khan’s compound. They thought we were coming for him too.

An article  from Foreign Affairs some time ago gives a nod to Bernard Baruch, warning in 1946 that the line between “safe” and “dangerous” (proliferative) nuclear activities would change and need constant reexamination.  Perhaps the current global expansion of nuclear energy warrants a redrawing of this line. Indeed, a contentious issue is what the actual definition of “right to enrich” in Article IV of the NPT means.  Iran is the most popular example of navigating this discrepancy, but even South Korea, a U.S. ally, is making a push for domestic enrichment capability.  For many countries, this is seen as an important step in developing their nuclear industries, as well as a mark of national sovereignty.  If it is indeed a sovereign right for all states to acquire nuclear power, we all must ensure that the reactors and fuels used are properly safeguarded and 100% accounted for. Provided that signatories from here on out accept certain limits on enrichment and accept enhanced safeguards, the risk of proliferation can be mitigated.  In order to further curb these risks, the growth of nuclear power makes worldwide adoption of the Additional Protocol to the NPT a necessity.  A first step we could take is to prohibit any new country acquiring nuclear power to begin their program until they adopt the NPT with the Additional Protocol. Certainly more rules and regulations imply a lack of trust, but when it comes to this potentially destructive technology, “trust, but verify” ought to be at the top of our lexicon.

Though there is a correlation between the growth of civilian nuclear power and the risk of further proliferation, this does not make proliferation a certainty.  Civilian nuclear facilities can give states cover to develop nuclear weapons capabilities, but the political and economic motives to pursue such a weapon will likely be the primary instigators. To be sure, factors like deterrence theory, domestic politics and great-power ambitions have played a role in the decision of some states to acquire nuclear weapons; but the majority of states with nuclear power have refrained from this acquisition.  To further influence these decisions, the U.S. and other powers should make it clear to all that the costs of acquiring a weapon will outweigh the benefits, while they themselves continue to demonstrate “good faith” under the NPT by leading a reinvigorated movement towards nuclear disarmament.

Who has what when it comes to nuclear weapons, at a glance.

Most of all, in order to curb the proliferation risks that come with the growth of nuclear energy, one more thing will be required of individual states, that each with their own individual interests, deplore: cooperation.  This is especially true when countering nuclear terrorism, something that cannot always be dealt with by IAEA inspectors or conventional theories of deterrence.  The one thing we can control is access to fissile material; and all states that possess any facility containing it should have to accept more intrusive control measures and inspection procedures than they do today.  T.S. Eliot remarked that sometimes people “…dream[ing] up of systems so perfect that no one will need to be good.”  If he was correct, then the greatest implication of spreading nuclear power will have to be vigilance.

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Don’t Fughettabout Foreign Policy: Risks and Trends for 2014

David Kessler and Peter Kouretsos – Happy New Year, everybody! Big things happened in 2013: Dave and I graduated in May and we’re all still here, which means that the world didn’t blow itself up. And to us here at the Brooklyn Diplomat, that’s a reassuring sign that we’re doing ok and that it could always be worse. Not great, but ok. It helps us put things into perspective.  But we digress. We’ve been reading lots of articles lately about what to expect in 2014, and while we’ve found some of the trends, forecasts and “predictions” out there to be agreeable and insightful, the overall impression we got can only be described by one of our favorite movies (because Brooklyn, that’s why)

Ok, maybe not exactly BS, but lots of this stuff seemed pretty obvious. It’s not very Brooklyn at all. And as the official trendsetter of the modern world, the gentlemen and scholars of Brooklyn ought to have a say in what to expect in a post 2013 world.  Main takeaway from all of what you’re about to read right now: Foreign policy. Start caring about it. While last year’s headlines were dominated by economics, just one look at any of the headlines this past month shows that 2014 will be a “Foreign Policy” year.  This is what Dave and I are thinking about now as we begin 2014.  At the end, we’ll also share with you our New Year’s resolutions.

First Up: PETER KOURETSOS

#5) MENA unrest expands:

2014 is going to be a record year for violence in Iraq (a great primer can be found here). Runner ups in terms of unrest and instability are going to be obvious, Egypt and Libya, where the money is running out and the governments being propped up at the moment simply are not working. There are also serious concerns of a security vacuum in Afghanistan with talks of a U.S. 2014 pullout if a Bilateral Security Agreement doesn’t get hammered out; failure here would mean Afghanistan spirals back to the way it was before the 2001 invasion and we’re back to square one.

Adding fuel to the fire in Egypt, the interim government backed by Sisi (who may very well run for President soon) and the SCAF recently declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Both the Brotherhood and the government have reached a point of no return. By labeling the Brotherhood a terrorist organization and denying them any political voice, they’ve committed themselves to stamping them out for good; or risk them returning to power and destroying them. The Brotherhood, now backed into a corner, doesn’t have much to lose. And when one group has everything to lose while another has nothing to lose, it rarely ends well. It’s a very desperate situation. It’s a very…Syria(ous) situation…

Al-Qaeda is certainly not what it used to be after bin Laden’s death, but that does not necessarily make it weaker or stronger; it just makes it different. And if we don’t adapt to that, “different” will become “dangerous.”

2014 will be a “good” year for al Qaeda.  We will see a proliferation of small, local al Qaeda “units” that will take the jihad locally. This is not to say that some groups won’t target the U.S. directly anymore, but the emphasis will be local, where they can take advantage of economic hardship, weak, ineffective and unresponsive governance, and social unrest.  They have, for example, used Western Syria as a haven to launch operations into Iraq’s Anbar province, most notably in Fallujah.

Violence will grow and al Qaeda and its affiliates will grow.  The willingness of the U.S. and the Allies to devote significant resources to deal with these threats is not what it used to be (as opposed to right after 9/11).  To make matters more troublesome, the capacity for local governments and “partners” to pick up the slack simply isn’t there.  Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are bursting at the seams and risk becoming more unstable as they take in more refugees from the Syrian war, which is not ending any time soon.  If you want to know whether this new decentralized and fragmented al Qaeda is weaker or stronger than it was before Osama bin Laden’s death, you’re asking the wrong question.  It is certainly not what it used to be, but that does not necessarily make it weaker or stronger; it just makes it different.  In the environment described above, the so-called “al Qaeda 2.0” after 2011 becomes “al Qaeda 3.0” in 2014.

 #4) Consequences of an Iran deal:

As per the accord hammered out last November, Iran has halted its 20% enrichment and just began blending down its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium this January. The West has made good on their end of the bargain by lifting some sanctions.

Hassan Rouhani was elected for this very reason. Sanctions were biting and he has been tasked to stop the bleeding. He does not have the go-ahead from the Ayatollahs to completely eliminate enrichment, but the momentum is there in 2014 for a deal with limited enrichment in exchange for a seat as a member of the international community.

We will find very soon whether a nuclear deal with Iran is going to happen, maybe even by the end of the first quarter.  If it does, oil prices could take a hit when Iranian crude enters the market and the Saudis, Venezuelans and Russians will find themselves in a very difficult position. Petroleum exports account for a disproportionate amount of their national revenues because they have chosen not to diversify, mainly because they just never saw the need to.  Will they decrease production (and lower exports) to keep prices where they’re at now, or do they continue at current production levels and watch prices fall?

Either way, if a deal with Iran happens this year, the funds used to grease the wheels of these petro-states could begin to dry up. But if a deal does not occur, oil prices could spike, the potential for an Israeli strike will go up, the risk of other MENA states going nuclear goes up and the Iranians move much more quickly to a nuclear “breakout” capability.

3) Elections happening just about everywhere:

I know people are talking about U.S. Midterm Elections and are also on the lookout for anyone announcing a 2016 Presidential run, but I’ll let Dave take that one.  Pretty much any emerging market most investors have been talking about that can have elections this year is having elections. China is the exception here since they don’t have elections. I am also not counting Russia in this either.

A little under half of the world’s population will vote some time in 2014. The Economist breaks it down for you.

When I’m talking emerging markets I’m talking Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Columbia, Turkey (a full list here).  Many of these large economies have one thing in common: most of the parties in power now have been in power for more than a decade.  And for at least the past 10 years, the effectiveness of their governance has been questionable.  These countries are at a crossroads; a case in point is Turkey.  PM Erdogan must step down due to term limits but he can still win and hold the ceremonial office of President this year; we could see a Prime Minister-President seat-holding scenario similar to Putin’s Russia with Dmitry Medvedev.  But Erdogan’s AKP will still need to win local elections, and though they are still generally popular, recent discontent with the AKP’s strongarm tactics and a political crisis sparked by the Gezi Park protests could lose them some seats.

Brazil is another notable country with major elections to watch, and the World Cup (plus with the Olympics two years away) will add more to its complexity.  President Dilma Rousseff’s party will likely stay in 2014, but only because Latin American politics as a whole is uniquely more populist and often lacks strong opposition parties. Economic growth has also plummeted while public funds have been used to prepare the country for the World Cup and the Olympics. Extravagant stadiums next to run-down favelas will present the world with a Latin American version of Charles Dickens’ “A Tale of Two Cities.”

And as for the most populous Muslim country in the world in the ever-growing and important Southeast Asian region, Indonesia undergoes both Presidential and Parliamentary elections; it would do the United States some good if they re-engaged and reaffirmed their commitment to an Asia-Pacific “pivot.”  And although the popular topic right now is Ukraine, all eyes will be on Thailand as it navigates a political crisis between rival factions; it’s unlikely that an election will solve anything without an agreement between the clashing parties, and the risk of a military coup is always there.

#2 )Reforming China:

The Peoples Republic of China’s (PRC) Third Plenum launched significant and unprecedented political reforms that will fundamentally alter how China is governed.  In 2014 we will see the beginning of those, and consequently, the beginning of a new China. I’m still optimistic about China in 2014; the PRC’s resilience amid the decades of challenges it’s faced has been far too consistent to bet against.

By a show of hands, who’s betting against China in 2014? Nobody? Ok, cool, just making sure.

In Xi Jinping’s first year of governance, he’s engaged in more reform than in the PRC’s past 20 years.  This means real economic reform, a free-trade zone in Shanghai, anti-corruption moves, things that will get China on track for a serious restructuring.  But reform in China will make lots of people who have an interest in the status quo very unhappy. The Plenum was meant for Xi to consolidate as much power for himself to strong-arm these things through. The core issues and problems have never been external for China.  They have always been about, well…China. China’s core interests have always been domestic security and national unity. In fact, the new National Security body that was established after the Plenum, unlike ours, is focused on cracking down on internal matters like corruption, protests and unrest in the countryside.

China has greatly benefited from globalization, but they also have a long history of getting hurt when they expose themselves too much to the whims of other nations and foreign-based corporations that want to do business there.  The Opium Wars and the Unequal Treaty system during the 19th and early 20th centuries are the most popular examples of this.  This is why China has and will always be wary of any “comprehensive” and “binding” trade agreements and other multilateral treaties. China would much rather negotiate bilaterally, with one nation at a time, and on its own terms. So although the Bali talks and Doha give me hope for comprehensive international trade agreements, I’m not expecting China to commit to anything like it in 2014.

And if things get uneasy internally for China, with discontent and nationalism coming to a head, count on Xi and the Party to release some steam from the tea kettle and deflect those energies towards Japan and its neighbors who are suspicious of a more aggressive China. And in this kind of pressure-cooker environment, with all of their history and provoking the risk for a showdown with the Japanese as the Chinese reform process beings is real.

#1) The U.S. walks alone

The U.S. walks alone at the start of 2014, but it’s never time for it to throw in the towel. 2014 is a pivotal foreign policy year, and if they play their cards right, the United States can mitigate 2014’s risks and repair the damages of 2013.

Ok, Geopolitics 101 stipulates that there are exceptions to this: the British, the Canadians, the Mexicans and the Israelis. These relationships are maintained because of strategic choice and necessity, although there have been discussions about Israel’s discomfort with their U.S. relationship as of late.

Those exceptions aside, I am seeing signs that we’re beginning to live in a world where U.S. Foreign Policy has become less clear and less certain and decisive.  Our cuts in Defense and foreign aid make the rest of the world uneasy, and question our commitments. We’re also beginning to taper, and the money that used to float around and find its way to other nations’ markets isn’t going to be there anymore.  All other countries tied to the U.S. are concerned and are questioning the traditional terms of their relationship: South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brazil, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Germany and France come to mind.  This includes trying to move away from U.S. standards in the global economy and changing the way they think about security, especially in light of the NSA revelations.  There is a level of uncertainty in the world that we have not seen in decades from the world’s only superpower, and I will be closely watching to see how this plays out in 2014.

Am I saying that the U.S. is in decline? No. I won’t go that far and jump on the bandwagon that started picking up steam during the 2008 financial crisis. The dollar is still strong.  The Chinese still want their kids to come to American universities. Any internationals who want to move their money out of the country brings it here.  We are still a safe bet. The legal system works and we are politically stable. In terms of U.S. innovation in energy, agriculture, biotechnology, nanotechnology, etc; the U.S. still dominates. The “dysfunctional Congress” even passed a $1.1 trillion bill that funds the government through 2014.  So no, America is not in decline. Its foreign policy is in decline. It is losing its ability to get what it wants abroad.

The same applies with Obama and Congress.  2014 will be the President’s last best chance to push an agenda for the rest of his term; after 2014 everyone gets so caught up in the election season that it’ll be difficult for his Administration to get any attention or support after this year.

As President Obama goes live in his State of the Union Address on Tuesday, his focus will likely be on the economy, the issues of growing inequality, a partisan Congress and a stagnant middle class, all important concerns.  But after all that’s happened in the last 6 months on the international front, pay close attention to which issues the President will emphasize besides the domestic ones.   I can’t say what he will choose as foreign policy priorities, but a comprehensive agreement with Iran on curbing their nuclear program, wrapping up Afghanistan and repairing the strained friendships with our allies would be a good start.  President Obama still has 3 more years in office, and second-term Presidents in their last couple of years in office often try and leave their mark on foreign policy.  And with the Obamacare rollout leaving a black mark on the President’s legacy, foreign policy can help save what’s left of it.  And I think he knows this.  And with all the talk about “national interests” in foreign policy discussions on the news, most Americans see the only “national interest” as nation building here at home. The polls speak for themselves: A majority of Americans are more disillusioned with the U.S.’s role abroad than ever before.  They just don’t see the point anymore.  And after Iraq and Afghanistan, “fughettaboutit” isn’t just a Brooklyn word anymore.  Let’s just hope that Obama doesn’t fughettabout foreign policy in 2014.

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Last but not least: DAVID KESSLER

#5) Pope Francis and the Catholic Church:

If I had to point to any one trend that I was most excited about or which I thought would be the most profound in 2014, it would be the current direction of the Catholic Church.  After emerging from the College of Cardinals as Pontifex Maximus only a year ago, Pope Francis (Formerly Bishop of Argentina Jorge Bergoglio) has already rocked the boat with his humble demeanor, his progressive tone when making remarks on various “hot topics,” and his focus on social justice for the World’s poor.  Furthermore, Francis was the first Pope to be elected from the Americas and is the first Jesuit Pope. As of late, Pope Francis has even been named Person of the Year by Time for 2013.  And as two young, Jesuit-educated, Christian gentlemen (Pete’s Orthodox and he’s excited for more Ecumenical dialogue between East and West now), we’re pleased with Pope Frank.

I see this pivot in the Church marking a major shift in how it will conduct itself in the 21st century.  While recent Popes have made significant strides toward modernizing the Church, namely Pope John XXIII and Pope John-Paul II, Pope Francis seems to be someone who can strike a balance of fully mobilizing the global youth who have been unable to identify with the Church as of late, while still maintaining the more “traditional” Catholic following.  From what I gather from Pope Francis’ various remarks, the Church will certainly be much more aggressive in the fight to combat poverty in the so-called, “developing,” world.  Furthermore, to conclude endless discourses on questions such as homosexuality, abortion, and other social flashpoints for the Church, the Pope will likely brush those questions aside in favor of addressing what he feels are the most pressing issues: poverty, faith, and community.  These are issues that he can unite the most people around and bring them closer to the Church, regardless of their views on the contentious topics.

#4) Syria:

Assad has taken some hard hits, but he has also been able to exploit and leverage the diverse conglomerate of rebel groups to survive. I don’t think he’s going anywhere in 2014.

The prolonged civil war in Syria seems to encapsulate many different global struggles, both direct and proxy.  There seems to be no immediate end to the fighting, and one can only hope that 2014 is the year that the bloodshed is concluded.  More broadly the Assad regime in Syria, assisted by both Hezbollah and Iran, is struggling to remain in power as an Alawite-led regime in the predominately Sunni state of Syria.  Meanwhile, the Sunni Arab States and al-Qaeda continue to push back against the regime and support the revolution.

Though I foresee a prolonged conflict in the Levant for a while longer, any victor in Syria (if there ever is one) would probably be Assad.  Although the international community has called for him to step down and/or negotiate a settlement, Assad and his regime have shown resilience and an incredible tolerance for pain; thus far this is evidence that he still commands substantial legitimacy among his supporters, and the state is robust enough to survive in 2014 and beyond.  In particular, the military seems to be generally supportive of his leadership, in contrast to what we saw in Egyptian in 2011, where the Egyptian SCAF refused to continue backing then-President Hosni Mubarak.  There have been some defections, but as long as the military remains with Assad, I do not believe he will be defeated unless a greater outside force (al-Qaeda or a foreign power) is able to bolster the rebels to overpower the Syrian military or dissuade them from supporting Assad.

#3) A Strained US – Russia Relationship:

Presidential Candidate Mitt Romney memorably stated in 2012 that Russia is, “without question our [the United States’] number-one geopolitical foe.” For the record, the jury is still out on whether this remark is true.  But as of late there have been many events to suggest that this Cold War mentality may be relevant.  Perhaps the most talked about man involving a deteriorating U.S. –Russian relationship, Edward Snowden, will continue to test US-Russia relations into the coming year.  The slight against the U.S. when Russia agreed to give him asylum against cries for “justice” in the U.S. is ever present. Furthermore, we still don’t know the true extent of the damage he’s done or what it is he took with him. Granting him amnesty is probably off the table at this point, since he’s been to two countries that are two of the U.S.’s greatest cyber-security threats (China and Russia). Continuing points from the previous stated trend, the Syrian Civil War is also an indirect struggle between Russia and the United States.  The United States has traditionally backed the most powerful Sunni nation in the region, Saudi Arabia, while Russia has traditionally backed the most powerful Shia nation, Iran, and consequently, Syria.  Thus, the war in Syria looks ever more like the Cold War-era proxy conflicts. As a positive, the recent deal for Syria to voluntarily give up its chemical weapons for destruction was jointly agreed upon between Secretary of State John Kerry and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has shown that we can find some common ground on some issues.

C’mon guys. It’s only awkward if you make it awkward.

During the upcoming 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Russia may also display the status of relations between the two nations.  To prepare for Russia’s gig on the global stage, President Putin has granted amnesty to thousands of prisoners, including his biggest rival, oil-tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky.  This is an attempt to show that Russia has not receded to its harsh Soviet ways.  It should be noted, however, that these acts of “good will” may only temporarily improve Russia’s image rather than act as precedent for real reform within Putin’s Russia.  The US-Russian relationship will certainly make headlines over the upcoming year, but if the past is a judge for things to come, it looks like only headlines we’ll be reading will be about a stagnant or deteriorating relationship. Let’s hope at least for the former.

#2) A key year for the U.S. in 2014:

On the U.S. domestic front, another exciting year of political gridlock and debacle is on the horizon.  As President Obama enters the New Year with his lowest approval ratings since his inauguration, he will be quarterbacking the salvation effort for his signature legislation, the Affordable Healthcare Act (ACA, aka “Obamacare.”)   The website setbacks we’ve been reading about will be corrected in the coming weeks and Obamacare will receive its real test: whether the nation is willing to choose to enter healthcare exchanges or pay the penalty of not acquiring healthcare.  From my point of view, the ACA is here to stay and Americans will likely warm up to it if, and only if, enough people choose to enroll in Health Insurance rather than pay the penalty.  Whether the new system will work as efficiently or as cost effectively as legislators suggested is to be seen in the coming years.  However, the Democrats have been running on the ACA (or at least the idea of it) for nearly 50 years. They cannot afford for this to fall through. And it’s unlikely that Republicans will repeal it; it’s much easier to give out a social good than to take it away.  Thus, I would say that Obamacare is here to stay at least for the next 8-10 years.

Democrats, Republicans, and pretty much everybody else may be pointing fingers at each other, but one thing’s for sure: U.S. leaders have their work cut out for them in 2014.

On the flip side of American politics, the Republican Party will look to maximize the Obamacare confusion and win support to its cause while overcoming internal discord.  Within the party, two very distinct groups have emerged that are going to butt heads: the traditional “establishment” Republicans and the Tea Party Republicans.  Outspoken members of the Tea Party faction include Senators Ted Cruz, Rand Paul and Congresswoman Michele Bachmann.  Notable establishment GOP members include Senator John McCain and Governor Chris Christie.  While the traditional Republicans hold the majority of high ranking Republican positions, the Tea Partiers have secured some significant grassroots support.  The Tea Party’s most notable contribution (or lack thereof) to politics was their integral part in triggering the Federal Government Shutdown of 2013.  During this episode, the Tea Party legislators did exactly what they said they would do when running for their seats in government: attack the ACA by any means.  Unfortunately for both the nation and the Republican Party, this “noble stand” was a decisive defeat that cost the country weeks of Federal Government impotence.

From where I stand, the division and subsequent struggle for the Republican Party, ought to happen as soon as possible.  Political infighting followed by consolidation is nothing new, even internationally: Remember how Tony Blair led an internal movement within his Labour Party, moving it from the far-left/left to the center-left. And in 1997 the Labour Party achieved its first election victory since 1979.  Likewise, a strong leader from the center-right in the U.S. can assume a similar Tony Blair-like role over the party before the Presidential election of 2016 and move it in a more moderate direction.  The sooner and more decisive the struggle, the better.  A good barometer of this internal struggle will certainly be the upcoming 2014 congressional elections.

#1) Have No Fear, the Global Economy is Here!:

Finally, in regards to the global economy, I predict a very fruitful year.  [The majority of] Europe will return to greater prosperity and competitiveness than before the European debt crisis began.  The U.S will continue to grow its economy but it too must find solutions to reducing its public deficit so as to achieve sustainable economic growth.   The Chinese will continue to power forward with after a year of robust growth in 2013, although we’re beginning to see signs that they’re beginning to pump the brakes .  Japan will continue to be mired in its incredible public debt (which it will attempt to solve by printing more money) and oncoming demographic collapse (which can be mended by immigration reform, but probably little will be done to address that).  Russia and Brazil will get their time in the sun during the 2014 Winter Olympics in Russia and the 2014 World Cup in Brazil.  Both events will be great opportunities to show off the economic advantages for foreign investment in their respective countries.  Russia ought to seek continued growth, which has been strong since President Putin came to power. Brazil, on the other hand, has seen rather sluggish economic growth as of late and will certainly try to reverse that trend. As for the smaller economies of the world, they ought to perform positively if history is any judge of future trends.  Overall, the coming year will continue to see a dramatic reduction in Global Poverty and the world economy will grow substantially.

Nobody can account for all the bumps in the roads, and I’m sure 2014 will see its fair share of black swans. But the world will keep spinning.

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Two New Year’s Resolutions from two new graduates:
Pete: “Apply to Grad School in the Fall so I can defer my student loans next year!”
Dave: “See more friends and keep thinking scholarly and happy thoughts! We’ll get through 2014 everybody, let’s also try to enjoy it a little too!”

Deal or No Deal?: A Primer on the Iran Deal, Your Questions Answered

So after playing some catch up on the Iranian nuclear negotiations, it’s pretty clear that the U.S. has made a lot of people in policymaking positions quite angry. But not everyone has been following it, and if you want some quick answers to those questions that you’re too embarrassed to ask, I’m here to help.

Pete, what’s this whole Iran thing about?
Ok, short story: The question revolves around the status of their nuclear program. Iran has always maintained that its nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes (nuclear power/energy). Even though Iran has denied working toward nuclear weapons, it has said it will not submit to any plan that would totally eliminate its nuclear program. By this they mean the right to enrich their own uranium for energy.

Ok, so they said it’s for peaceful purposes, nuclear power is fine, what’s the problem?

A lot of people are uncomfortable with the fact that they possess the infrastructure and technology to manage the entire nuclear fuel cycle from start to finish – from digging uranium out of the ground to generating power with it. An offshoot of mastering the fuel cycle is that you can take it to the next level by making a nuclear bomb. The problem here is that you can use the same centrifuges that enrich uranium to low quantities (~3.5% for nuclear energy) for enriching uranium to higher quantities (90% for nuclear weapons). Iran has enriched some 200kg of its uranium stockpile up to 20%. Why 20%? I don’t know, it seems like a random number but I’ve read that once you break 20%, enriching to 90% is not so difficult anymore. And that’s enough to get some people worried.

Another issue is that they’ve built facilities without reporting them to the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) beforehand, some in urban areas, others under mountains (Those make them tough targets for a military strike). One such reactor that you may have heard about recently, the “Arak” reactor, that once completed, would be able to make plutonium fairly efficiently, another possible source for nuclear weapons. The Iranians have also deliberately deceived inspectors about secret sites and the status of their program. They’ve also been developing ballistic missile technology and reports surfaced a few years ago that they’ve been trying to develop a nuclear warhead. And it’s not just us who want them to stop; in 2006 the Chinese and the Russians got on board with the U.S. and the rest of the UN Security Council and began pressuring Iran to halt their nuclear program. I’ll say it again: in 2006 the Chinese and the Russians got on board and began pressuring Iran to halt their nuclear program. Considering all the things we can’t get Moscow and Beijing to agree with us on, I’d say that if they’re concerned about this, it’s becoming a problem.

Hmm, sounds like it may be a problem. What have we been doing about it?

So since Iran has not complied, it’s been punished with economic sanctions, a great deal of which has hit its oil and gas industry. If you want to learn more about them, here’s a good backgrounder on them, courtesy of BBC. The Iranians have also been experienced technical setbacks, the most widely cited example courtesy of a computer virus known as Stuxnet, allegedly developed by the Israelis and the United States (which has been denied by both). Also every now and then a nuclear scientist doesn’t show up to work at the lab because he’s too busy getting blown up [possibly by Israeli intelligence]. And while not explicitly using the phrase “military strike,” President Obama and other senior administration officials have repeatedly claimed that “all options are on the table” when handling this issue.

Yikes, so why aren’t the Iranians backing down?

The 1968 NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), which almost every country in the world abides by, says that parties of the treaty have the “inalienable right…to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” So the quick answer is that international law says they can.

The more complicated answer is that the Iranian Revolution of ’79 still lives. What do I mean by that? The same people who are in power are vanguards of the anti-Western revolution that established the Islamic Republic of Iran when they overthrew the Western-backed Shah in 1979. They’re still pretty upset about the decades of interference on the part of the U.S. and Western Europe in the Iranian political economy during the 19th and 20thcenturies. And as the heirs of the great Persian Empire, they are a proud people. They want to be recognized as a regional power again, and a nuclear program is a way into the country club.

Another reason, if Iran really does want a nuclear weapons capability, is defense. Iranian leaders believe that the U.S. and her allies (namely Saudi Arabia and Israel) will stop at nothing to overthrow their regime. The last President of the United States called the regimes in Iraq, Iran and North Korea the “axis of evil” and so far we’re 1 for 3 in the regime-change business. Another leader by the name of Muammar Gaddafi willingly relinquished his nuclear stockpile years back but just a few years ago saw his country bombarded by NATO before he was dragged through the streets of Tripoli and executed. And let’s not forget that in the 80s Saddam was on our side, and we gave him plenty of help in his war with Iran that lasted 8 years and killed hundreds of thousands on both sides. With this kind of baggage weighing on the leadership’s mind, a nuclear deterrent may be an attractive option.

But even if they didn’t want a nuclear weapon, the Iranians have managed to give many countries good reason to suspect that their “peaceful” nuclear program is actually a cover for a covert push to develop a weapons program.

What about Israel? Their Prime Minister was trolling the negotiations and just called this deal we brokered with Iran “a historic mistake.”

In many ways, Israel has good reason to be worried about a more powerful Iran. The Iranian leadership has repeatedly called the Jewish state a “cancer that must be removed” and actively supports Hezbollah and Hamas, the Lebanese and Palestinian militant groups with a long history of attacking Israel. But it’s pretty doubtful that the Iranians are going to fire a nuke over Tel Aviv or Riyadh (the Saudis are also a party with security concerns about a nuclear Iran). If they do that, Tehran just signed their death warrant and it’s game over for the regime. I’m sure they know that. But a nuclear Iran may be emboldened enough by their new deterrent to support and finance Hezbollah and Hamas. It may also start a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, with governments in Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc. all pursuing a nuclear weapons capability to counter Iran. So it’s a mixed bag, but if you stick your hand in it, you’ll probably get stung pretty bad. That being said, Iran is a problem for Israel, but not in the same way that it’s a problem for the emirs in the Gulf. I’m going to go out on a limb here and say that Israel may not like it, but it can probably live with a belligerent Iran.

That actually kind of really sucks. What’s our plan?

The options are really contingent on what you want to achieve. All around though, they’re not all that great.

The first not-all-that-great plan is to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites (the ones we know about). Best case scenario, this would probably set them back a year or two, maybe even just a few months. Bottom line though, it will make Tehran more likely to develop a nuclear weapon if they weren’t going to already. We’d also probably lose support from key international players to stop Iran’s nuclear program. In fact, we’ll probably lose international support for a lot of other things going forward.

The second not-all-that-great plan is a follow up of the first bad plan: an invasion by our Armed Forces and a coalition of the willing (whichever countries want to help out) to overthrow the regime. Why not go all the way? You bomb them and give them a chance to recover? You’re not sure if you got all the nuclear sites? All that fissile material lying around waiting to get stolen now? C’mon bro, finish the job…Unfortunately whichever President authorizes that is doomed. After Iraq, this option is not happening.

The third not-all-that-great plan is to try and overthrow the regime in other ways. This is problematic, since the regime has shown and incredible amount of resilience since ‘79. Even during the “Green Revolution,” the 2009 protests after the disputed Iranian presidential elections, citizens were calling for government reforms, not the overthrow of the ayatollahs. Furthermore, any internal movements that we give even moral support to would lose all their legitimacy anyway.

The fourth not-all-that-great plan is to just keep doing what we’re doing: Force Iran to unconditionally surrender and give up its nuclear program in its entirety. Like I said before, those sanctions have definitely been biting, and covert action like cyber-warfare and assassinations have been successful in setting their program back some. But despite what we’ve been doing, the Iranian nuclear program has continued to grow. We can try to delay it, but that’s all we’d be doing: delaying.

The fifth not-all-that-great plan: negotiating a deal directly with Tehran. If my Spidey senses are spot on this time, this seems to be the thrust of what the P5 +1 (U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France, + Germany) actually hopes to accomplish in the near future: Iran gets its nuclear program, but with enough restrictions and inspections that everyone can accept it as peaceful. The downside is that this would be difficult to enact and no deal will please the Israelis, the Saudis or our Congress. Another thing to think about is that this all hinges on actually trusting Iran with a nuclear program, after it has cheated on past deals.

Ok, so we are negotiating with them, that looks like the least worst option. What’s this “deal” or “agreement” everyone’s talking about now?

The most straightforward explanation I found was this one by the New York Times; it has lots of pictures and short sentences. The agreement does not guarantee that Iran will make a bomb, but it certainly complicates it. The agreement lasts 6 months, when a more permanent agreement is supposed to get hammered out: No more enrichment above 5%; nuclear-related activity (no production of fuel, no nuclear research) on the Arak reactor stops; no new centrifuges; daily inspections to all nuclear facilities; all in exchange for unfreezing some overseas assets and some limited relief of sanctions that only amount to a few billion.

Good deal or bad deal?

It’s actually really not the deal that we should be thinking about now. This is an interim agreement that is easily revocable in six months if a comprehensive deal falls apart. It’s a test to see whether the Iranians are for real about this.  But if I had to judge, it’s a relatively safe deal that puts the burden of proof on Iran while at the same time showing some goodwill on our part to negotiate a settlement down the road.  Diplomacy is a two-way street, and easing some basic sanctions while maintaining the overreaching architecture let’s the Iranians walk away with something while not giving away too much on our part. And it’s pretty likely that the negotiators needed approval from the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in order to agree to the abovementioned agreement and bring home the bacon [ok, bad analogy, especially for a Muslim country] so that’s a pretty good sign. Only he can give the “ok” to build a bomb, and to our knowledge he has not given the order. This agreement blocks the most likely avenues for the Iranians to go forward with that. But as with all things, the devil is always in the details, and if any comprehensive agreement falls through, it will be because of those. I do still think that criticisms of this agreement are premature; the real deal hasn’t even started yet. And if the Iranians do end up cheating, we’ll be in a better position to ratchet up the sanctions again and dust off the war-plans.

Long-term though, it’s not so much the nuclear thing that I’m thinking about so much as Iran’s future in the Middle East. Strategically, we have nothing to gain by artificially weakening a country with a young, educated, large population that can be used to balance the Sunni-dominated Middle East. I’ll be looking for signs that we’re ready to start talking about reintegrating them into the international community. Bottom line: We have nothing to lose by gaming this thing out. And speaking out gaming it out, enjoy the football games and have a Happy Thanksgivukkah!

Halloween Scenario: Thoughts on the Cuban Missile Crisis

JOHN F. Kennedy confided to his brother, Bobby, that he thought the chances for nuclear war were 1 in 3, maybe even 50/50. Though that figure has been the subject of great debate ever since, we know things now that JFK did not know in the midst of the Crisis. In the words of Donald Rumsfeld, “There are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; that is to say, there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know we don’t know.” To me, the scariest Halloween movies aren’t the ones with all the obvious and out-in-the-open shock factor, with blood and gore; it’s those stories that leave room for your imagination to wander. Fear of the unknown. To contemplate what could go wrong when you know you only get one shot at this; one shot to get it right or else the world is over. But this just isn’t any Halloween story. This is the Cuban Missile Crisis. This is History, and History can be very, very scary.

FOR one, Kennedy and the EXCOMM knew that there were plenty of IRBMs and MRBMs on the island, however they were not confident that they were all operational; what they didn’t know was that in addition to those missiles on the island, the Soviets had already sent 100 tactical nuclear weapons to Cuba that were under the command of the local commander; these were nukes designed to be used on the battlefield and ready to launch at the discretion of the commanders without any further orders, codes or procedures from the Kremlin.

SECONDLY, estimates put the number of Russians on the island at roughly 3-4,000 “technicians” but we now know there were over 40,000 heavily armed “technicians” alongside over 200,000 Cuban troops with expert knowledge of the terrain. Would the Kremlin or Soviet commanders on the ground tolerate any casualties from a U.S. airstrike? If you were a Soviet commander on that island, where you could have probably cut the tension with a knife, would you have been able to distinguish between a “surgical” strike and an all out bombardment?

THIRDLY, there was no guarantee that an airstrike, even with over 1,200 sorties (a lot of planes), was going to take out all of the missiles, and that was only for the missiles that we knew about. That meant that a ground invasion would have to follow, involving tens of thousands of Marines, for on-the-ground confirmation of destroyed targets, to secure the other sites, and to overthrow the Castro regime. Estimates by the Joint Chiefs that just came out a few years ago estimated 18,500 American casualties in the first 10 Days, all under the assumption that there were only 3-4,000 Russians on the island. Those estimates also assumed nuclear weapons would not be involved: “If nuclear weapons were used by Soviet/Cuban personnel, there is no way to estimate the casualties”. If the airstrike had been carried out, followed by an invasion, which Kennedy was originally in favor for in the first EXCOMM week of the Crisis, and which he had on tap for the third week if the crisis hadn’t been resolved by then, it is quite likely that those tactical nuclear weapons would have been used against the American invaders. Moreover, our naval base at Guantanamo Bay probably would have been turned into a glass parking lot, along with the 9,500 Marines stationed on it. So what happens when tens of thousands of American troops get nuked? I don’t have to tell you what would probably happen after that.

BUT we know JFK didn’t opt for the strike. What actually happened? How was it ultimately resolved? The story was that in the first instance that the US, with a spy plane, discovered the Soviets had been sneaking nuclear missiles into Cuba. There was a week of private/secret deliberation during which Kennedy changed his mind several times. At the end of that week he ordered a blockade of the island (Oct 22) which he called a “quarantine,” of any further arms shipments going to Cuba (technically a “blockade” is an act of war, and that . That gave them time, and gave Khrushchev some breathing room and step back from the brink. That went on for a week, during which time the Soviets continued finishing construction of the missile sites as Adlai Stevenson embarrassed the Soviet Union for the entire world to see at the U.N. to drum up international support for the U.S. Check this out, you rarely see this stuff at the U.N. anymore:

By the end of the second week, tensions were fraying: 1) a US U-2 spy plane on a recon mission over Cuba was shot down over Cuban airspace, 2) a nuclear weapons test was conducted in the Pacific which Kennedy forgot about, and 3) another U-2 flew off course in Alaska and entered Russian airspace (which alarmed the Russians since they speculated this could have been a recon mission to prepare for a nuclear attack) and both sides scrambled their fighter planes to intercept it (or destroy it depending on which side you’re on). On the 20th, China invaded India. These were just a handful of events that could have bode ill for the Crisis, but it was clear that taken together, things were happening in such a way that made people think “this can’t go on for much longer.” The stress was unbearable.

IN the end, the President went with a creative option that consisted of what can be broken down into 3 parts: 1) a public deal, if you (the Soviets) withdraw the missiles, we (the U.S.) will pledge to never invade Cuba, 2) a private ultimatum in which Bobby Kennedy, sent by his brother, told Soviet ambassador Dobrynin, that if in 24 hours we find that you’re not taking action to withdraw those missiles, we’re going to do it for you and 3) a secret sweetener where Bobby essentially said “we’re not saying that we’ll trade for our missiles in Turkey, but if this crisis is resolved successfully, those missiles won’t be there anymore. But if you mention anything about it being part of the Cuba deal, the whole deal is off.” So to bring it together it was a public carrot, a private stick, and a private carrot. In fact, a VERY private carrot; so private in fact that only a handful of EXCOMM knew it had been offered; we know this because the night Bobby is at Dobrynin’s residence, some officials in the EXCOMM are still talking about how we can’t give up those missiles in Turkey.”

Fine, it was a close call. SO WHAT?

Clockwise from President Kennedy: President Kennedy, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Maxwell Taylor, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Deputy USIA Director Donald Wilson, Special Counsel Theodore Sorensen, Special Assistant McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson (hidden), Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director William C. Foster, CIA Director John McCone (hidden), Under Secretary of State George Ball, Secretary of State Dean Rusk

A thought. Bundy, Rusk, LeMay, McNamara, Thompson, the whole gang. These guys and just about everyone else in Kennedy’s circle during the Crisis were the A Team. The Wiz-kids and the Wizards (older guys). Strategic Giants. I can go on and on. I’m not saying that the people who have Obama’s ear are not qualified (they’re sure as heck more qualified than me), and it may be too early to tell, but I just don’t see many people like the ones who formed the original EXCOMM 51 years ago in Obama’s circle. Granted, those same guys got us into Vietnam, though. That being said, I think the debate we’ve been having about Iran has become so politicized that it will be difficult for our national security decision-makers to find a creative solution.

Let’s not kid ourselves about Iran’s intentions. Critics dismiss Israel as the “boy who cried wolf” when Netanyahu calls for red lines against Iran as it inches closer to developing a nuclear weapons program. But let’s not forget the most obvious lesson of that children’s story: the wolf eventually does come, and it eats the boy. It’s pretty clear that even if Iran does not want a nuclear weapon outright (a very conservative assumption) they may want the capability to produce one. But just because that’s true, let’s not kid ourselves into thinking that there are only two options for the U.S. and its allies here either.

Every President since Kennedy has looked to the Cuban Missile Crisis for lessons to better handle contemporary crises. Obama is no exception.

Graham Allison, one of the foremost experts of the Crisis, has compared the situation with Iran to a “Cuban Missile Crisis in slow motion,” where a President (Obama) will eventually come to a confrontation where he will be forced by his advisors to make a decision: 1) attack 2) reluctantly accept a nuclear Iran. If you ask me, those are two really lousy options. But remember, those were the same options presented to Kennedy in the Missile Crisis, and Kennedy spent those 13 days searching for an alternative. Bomb Iran and you may delay their program, but that’s pretty much all you’d accomplish: delay, foster further mistrust, and convince them to develop the capability in secret. Acquiesce to their new status as a nuclear power once they develop the capability and you just took back years of rhetoric about “red lines” and “credibility” and may have very well started a nuclear arms race in a region. It’s clear that like Kennedy, Obama does not want either option. The big lesson for Iran is this: if allowing Iran to get a nuclear bomb is as unacceptable as the White House and every other U.S. official make it out to be, and if an air strike on Iran could have a catastrophic chain of events and therefore is an equally terrible option, we should be aggressively searching for something in the space between these. I don’t think it was a coincidence that the new negotiations with the Iranians began on the anniversary of the Missile Crisis this year, and you can be sure that all leaders on both sides have looked to that event for lessons. Let’s just hope that they don’t draw the wrong conclusions from it.

Weekend Wrap-up

1) The Bomb Didn’t Beat Japan…Stalin Did: The most interesting read of the week goes to Ward Wilson’s argument in Foreign Policy that the Japanese surrender had far more to do with the Soviet Union’s entry into the Pacific Theater than with the dropping of the atomic bombs. Revisionist bits like this are nothing new, and the debate on Japan’s surrender has raged on for more than half a century. However he does make a convincing case, which I encourage you to read. But in the end, Wilson is not completely right or completely wrong; there is no silver bullet in history that explains a particular event. Whether you agree with him or not, the significance of the question of surrender and the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are at the heart of everything we think about nuclear weapons.

2) Syria’s future tied to freedom for captured Christian leaders: Prior to the Syrian conflict roughly 10% of Syria’s population was Christian. If the Christian community wants any future as a tolerated minority in their home-country, the release (or lack-thereof) of two Orthodox Christian bishops may decide their fate. Moreover, while uncertain now, the future for any minority group’s survival in Syria, be it religious, social or political are also at stake. But the op-Ed calls for the Turkish government to negotiate their release. Considering what they have been doing to their own minority Orthodox Christian community, this may be wishful thinking; or you can make the argument that Turkey does not want any more Christians in their country, and the threat of Syrian-Christian refugees flooding their country may be enough for Ankara to push for a guarantee the Ancient Church has a future.    

3) The most embarrassing graph in American drug policy: A few decades and hundreds of billions of dollars later, the policy community has little to show for their argument that billions of dollars spent on supply-side narcotics interdiction works. The theory of “Incarceration is a proxy of risk” is not being played out in the real world.

4) Another piece on Turkey this week, but only because of the monumental historical event that took place: The Fall of Constantinople. On May 29, 1453, Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Turks. The fall of the city marked the end of the Byzantine Empire and the significance of this cannot be overstated. Some have argued that many Byzantines fled to Italy, bringing with them ancient literature, philosophy and art that would culminate into the Renaissance. As the new capital of the Ottoman Empire, Constantinople became a symbol of Islamic power, and the religion gained a foothold in Eastern Europe. The Fall is celebrated by Turks to this day, as it marks the Golden Age of the Ottoman Empire. In recent years, fears of a “neo-Ottoman revival” have been circulated but I don’t buy it; that assumes Turkey completely dominates the Middle East again, which is unlikely. What is more likely however, is Turkey’s “soft power” in politics, economics, and diplomacy. Turkey may very well be the key to a more stable Middle East.