Though the U.S. and Latin American authorities make the occasional high-profile arrest, like the recent arrest of Mexico’s Public Enemy #1 Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, there is little reason to believe the drug war has any end in sight.
–Peter Kouretsos– No group seems to be more threatening to U.S. interests and national security than the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). ISIS has certainly been an attention-grabber; beheadings, mass executions, and public displays of their victims are just a few tactics in their toolkit. Their rampage and trail of carnage has been dubbed by many as not only medieval, but unique, an uncommon sight in the 21st century. However, while ISIS continues to dominate headlines through their atrocities in faraway lands, many are oblivious to the far more immediate and gruesome atrocities committed by Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs), commonly known as the “drug cartels” just south of our border, and the threat they pose to the United States and the Western Hemisphere.
A recent report read that in 2014, only Iraq and Syria had more deaths than Mexico. Estimates put conflict-related civilian death tolls in Iraq last year at roughly 18,000, and Syria 70,000, with thousands more wounded. Mexico? 15,000. That’s down from last year’s Mexican government estimates of 16,000, and another 60,000 since 2006. Judging from the Mexican government’s record of deflating these figures, the true numbers are likely far worse. Beheadings, dismemberments and acid baths are among the many tools they use to terrorize the public. ISIS routinely makes the headlines for killing journalists, but it is not uncommon to see a journalist’s or a local politician’s hanging corpse on public display in Mexican local plazas, with signs that read “This is my punishment for talking.” In fact, more than 60 journalists have been silenced for covering the drug war.
The immediate concern is Mexico, but the TCOs have plagued many countries. Out of the world’s 50 most violent cities, 34 are in Latin America. To be sure, this is not all of the violence is directly attributed to drug violence. Systemic corruption, political instability and poverty are all core issues, but the TCOs thrive in these environments and perpetuate the cycle. In many areas, the authority of the Mexican state appears to be extremely weak or nonexistent. A clear example of the extent to which the authority of the Mexican state is being challenged happened earlier this month, when a Mexican military helicopter was shot down by members of the up and coming Jalisco New Generation Cartel. In another incident in September 2014, TCOs kidnapped and murdered 43 students connected to drug-war protests at a college in Guerrero . It was later revealed this was made possible with the help of local politicians and the police. It is clear that the Mexican state has trouble protecting its own citizens, but it is even more troubling and embarrassing when it cannot protect the citizens of other countries. Since 2002, more than 600 Americans have been killed in Mexico by TCOs.
Further, once merely just a part of the narcotics supply chain, Mexican TCOs have begun taking control of the whole thing, interfacing directly with raw-product suppliers in South America at the top, and consolidating their control of retail distribution at the bottom. The biggest retail market of course is the U.S. It would be understandable for our public and the media to play down the TCO threat if the violence was restricted to south of the border; but since 2006, nearly as many Americans died in the U.S. from TCO-related violence (some 6,000) than American soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. They are covered as U.S. based “gang-wars,” but make no mistake, the TCO connection is there. Just last week the DEA seized 50kg of heroin in New York, the largest bust in New York state history; the drug ring which was busted had been receiving similar sized shipments each month, all from suppliers in Mexico. Over the last decade, Mexican TCOs have infiltrated thousands of U.S. cities and municipalities on a level that groups like ISIS can only dream about.
As in Mexico and Central and South America, once the TCOs have consolidated their control of major distribution networks here from local gangs, they will fight each other and anyone else who stands in the way, for market share. U.S. intelligence officials have publicly asserted that the ISIS poses no specific or credible threat to the U.S. homeland. However, can the same be said of the Mexican TCOs? The Middle East may be burning with no end in sight, but there’s a fire on our doorstep.
Since the conflict began last year, the U.S. and Europe have been limiting military support for Ukraine to non-lethal equipment; things that enable the individual soldier like body armor, medical supplies, and night-vision goggles. Late last year, President Obama signed a bill that authorized the provision of more lethal weaponry to Ukraine’s military but left it up to the White House to decide whether to follow through on that move. So technically speaking, the decision has already been pre-approved. The question is, should POTUS follow through, or leave it as an option down the road for him or for the Clinton Administration next administration?
Looming over the Minsk negotiations currently underway is the prospect of deeper sanctions on Russia, an economic collapse in Ukraine, and the risk that the conflict descends into an all out war. I would use the phrase “descend into proxy war” as a piece in Bloomberg did, but is it a proxy war if one of the supposed sponsors of said “proxy war” has been openly engaging in the war since last year? A technicality I suppose. But I digress.
So far, sanctions have failed in their aim of pressuring the Kremlin to reverse course in Ukraine. That’s not to say sanctions haven’t hurt the Russians, but it looks like they are willing to tolerate much more pain than the West is likely to give. And the increase in violence has brought back a question that the Europeans and NATO would rather not ask again: what is the next step if the Russians do not stop?
Below is a collection of most of the arguments for and against the U.S. providing the Ukrainians with lethal defensive weaponry. I read a lot, and I tend to get lost in my own thoughts, so a lot of times I jot things down like this. Welcome to my brain:
Do it:
Perhaps the most cited case for arming Ukraine is a joint report from the Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institution, and the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. Among the authors are former Supreme Allied Commander for NATO Admiral James Stavridis, former Under Secretary of Defense Michele Flournoy and former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine Steven Pifer. If you want to have an opinion on this issue, you should definitely read the report, but for the purposes of this blog post, here are some of the key points:
The U.S. should give Ukraine “lethal defensive arms.” This includes more capable counter-battery systems, UAV’s for reconnaissance, electronic countermeasure systems, light-armored vehicles, and anti-armor missiles. Providing them with things such as these will raise the costs for a new Russian offensive.
Giving Ukraine weapons will help bring the conflict to a stalemate. Moscow will get the message: the cost of further military action will be too high. From there, a political solution can be seriously discussed.
If the U.S. and NATO don’t support Ukraine in a concrete, military-oriented way, the Kremlin will see this inaction as a redux of Georgia in 2008, and turn its attention to destabilizing the Baltics in a similar fashion.
The aid won’t allow Ukraine to defeat a new full-scale attack by the Russian military. But it would allow Kiev to inflict significant costs on Moscow if they chose to attack.
Deterrence is the main takeaway here. Providing these lethal arms to Ukraine will deter further escalation by Putin. Providing these arms reduces the likelihood that Russia will escalate the crisis.
Pretty straightforward. Another decent summary is in an Op-Ed written by some of the above-mentioned authors of the report.
Don’t do it:
There has been equal, if not more, push-back by a number of scholars and subject-matter experts of similar stature to the authors of the joint reports. But it’s more scattered.
One piece that stood out was from Eugene Rumer, a Russia and Eurasia expert formerly at the U.S. National Intelligence Council, and Thomas Graham, a former senior director for Russia at the National Security Council. They have made a compelling case against sending lethal arms to Ukraine. Major points of their case, along with a some others:
Giving lethal arms will not sway the Kremlin to back down in Ukraine. And it could bring the West one step closer to a direct military confrontation with Russia.
We cannot be certain that these arms won’t go to the Ukrainian volunteer armies and private militia groups, which lack adequate training and discipline.
It will take many years to reform and bolster the Ukrainian military and security service, which is undertrained, underfunded, scowering for recruits, and crawling with Russian spies, making it unlikely that a delivery of such lethal arms would make a meaningful difference when going toe to toe with the Russians and the separatists.
What happens if Russia decides to escalate? Is the U.S. and NATO willing to enter a direct military confrontation with Russia?
Short of sending in the 82ndAirborne, it’s extremely doubtful that the U.S. and NATO won’t gain any significant comparative advantage over Russia in Ukraine.
If the Kremlin wants to destabilize Ukraine and ensure it does not successfully pivot Westward towards Europe, it will not stop until that happens.
Giving lethal arms and aid to Ukraine reinforces the narrative that the Kremlin tells the Russian people: Ukraine is now a puppet of the West, and the next stop for the West after Ukraine is regime-change in Moscow.
If the U.S. provides lethal arms to Ukraine, what next? Would doing this really change the Kremlin’s calculus? Similar lines of thought are presented here, here, and here.
Since last year’s escapades, each set of talks and ceasefire agreements has only moved towards deeper conflict. The violence in eastern Ukraine has created a humanitarian crisis – aside from the thousands killed and wounded, some one million have also been displaced – and a geopolitical crisis, between a European community that has hoped to put armed aggression in its past, and an insecure petro-state in decline determined to relive its imperial past and stick it to the West through armed aggression.
It seems that both sides agree that the Kremlin sees no reason to stop. It is also likely that Putin will try to solidify his gains in eastern Ukraine before the delivery of any more supplies or weaponry to Kiev can make a difference on the battlefield. Long-term, I see a frozen conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and I think this is something Putin would not mind having in his hand. I think it is also pretty clear to all parties involved that Ukraine matters much more to the Kremlin than it does to Washington, Brussels, Berlin, and the rest of Europe. What to do about that reality is the million dollar question (or if you’re in Russia, the 6,5109,500 ruble question.)
On January 3, 1961 the United States withdrew diplomatic recognition of the Cuban government and closed its embassy in Havana. But on December 17, 2014, after more than five decades of hostility and isolation, the two countries took a major step towards normalization. –Peter Kouretsos– Calm down and light yourself a cigar. Preferably a Cuban one. There are plenty of reasons to worry about President Obama’s announcement that the United States will begin to normalize relations with Cuba. But overall, it’s still the right thing to do.
Normalize: (verb); (pronounced “\ˈnȯr-mə-ˌlīz\”); to establish or resume (relations) in a normal manner, as between countries.
What exactly are we actually talking about here? Truthfully, we don’t know what will become of this development, other than “normalization of relations.” What does that mean? It means the U.S. and Cuba now have the ability to begin talks on how to establish official embassies, have diplomatic relations, and negotiate over trade with one another. But while the President has the power push to re-establish these diplomatic relations that were severed over five decades ago, the Senate still has a lot to say about what this all means going forward. For example, when the President nominates his ambassador to Cuba, the Republican-controlled Senate must confirm that nomination. And if at some point down the road, the President announces his intention to lift the U.S. embargo of the island-nation, the Republican-controlled Senate must sign off on that too. The elephant in the room is, of course, the embargo. Probably the most important sentence of the President’s address yesterday was “I look forward to engaging Congress in an honest debate on lifting this embargo.” Taken to its logical conclusion, this is where normalization could eventually lead.
This is not to say that severing relations with the Cubans and implementing the embargo didn’t always work. Our Cuba policy had its place in the context of the Cold War; it forced enormous costs on the Soviet Union, both politically and economically. But even back then, there were efforts to begin what ultimately happened yesterday, from several administrations. But for now, the Obama administration’s decision to begin warming U.S. – Cuban diplomatic ties will not result in a surge of imports and exports between the two nations. Further, restoring full relations with the United States will not solve all of Havana’s problems either; its restrictive policies have and will continue to make it difficult for companies to do business in Cuba. Their poor economy is not so much a result of the American isolation and embargo as it is the result of long-term structural problems; problems that will take considerable time and political will to reverse.
So what happens now? It’s important to keep in mind that this is just the initial start of negotiations between the two, which can cover a whole host of issues and take many years. If, as some critics fear, this initial warming of Cuban – American relations does not erode Cuban oppression, then the Congress surely won’t even think about eliminating the embargo, and President Obama or a future president can reverse these policy changes should they find the regime in Cuba to be uncooperative. But who knows? Maybe Hyman Roth can finally get that casino deal he was looking for all those years ago.
Let’s get one thing straight though: the Cubans are no angels. But the folks who make the argument that Cuba is too evil to have any sort of relationship with the United States quickly forget that we normalized relations with China, Vietnam and even Myanmar. Our foreign policy is littered with other examples of relationships with “immoral” nations. It’s a hard pill to swallow for some, but a strictly Wilsonian-based foreign policy only gets you so far. The world is complicated. We could do better to reserve our more coercive diplomatic and economic tools for other situations: like for the Islamic Republic of Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons program; for Russia’s recent escapades in eastern Europe; and for North Korea doing what North Korea does best.
There are many reasons to cry for a trial and public hanging for the Castros, but when the Castro brothers die, is the last building we want to have the most influence 90 miles from Jimmy Buffett’s house in Key West to be the Chinese embassy? We could either be part of the making of a potentially free Cuba in the future, or be bystanders. Because one thing is clear, Cuba is not going to collapse with the current status quo. And a pivot to the Asia-Pacific is nice, but the most important long-term commitment the U.S. can make is improving relations within our own hemisphere. It starts with things like this, and it can end with a reshaping of Latin American geopolitics. (More on that later.)
Food for thought: Currently, Senator Rand Paul is the only Republican-hopeful in the 2016 Presidential race to comment favorably on the President’s move on Cuba. And it turns out, this breakthrough in relations with Cuba was a lot of then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s doing.
Absolutely nothing, but you clicked on this, so it worked. Keep reading.
It’s amazing what can happen in 2 weeks when you’re on vacation. Ongoing conflict in the Levant (a fancy word for Syria, Lebanon Israel and Jordan), what looks like the beginning of a Third Iraq War, failing states in the Middle East, war between Russia and Ukraine, the usual tensions in East Asia, and an Ebola epidemic that just puts this all over the top. I’m probably missing some things, but you get the idea. Not exactly a good year for geopolitical stability. I suppose it could have been worse.
But then the week I get back, and American photojournalist James Foley gets beheaded by ISIS barbarians and the video is posted on YouTube for the world to see. I never knew him, but like me, I know that James was a History major from Marquette, a Jesuit University in the Midwest. He was a teacher who wanted to tell the world’s most difficult stories and make a difference, much like the Jesuits that educated him and myself. His grizzly murder, however, cannot be separated from the seriousness of the threat that radical Islam (the Salafi jihad movement in particular) poses to the world, and the Iraq crisis we are reading about on the cover of every major newspaper.
Which brings us to the Islamic State (also known as the ISIS/ISIL). Dealing with the Iraq crisis and the ISIS threat is a rough subject. There are a ton of folks that got the ISIS wrong, possibly even President Obama. The President’s take on this jihadist enemy has never inspired confidence in the counterterrorism community, and many have argued that his reaction over time to the rise of the ISIS does not reflect the seriousness of the threat we now face. In many ways, I understand it. President Obama sees other foreign policy objectives as more important in the long-run, and the Middle East crises are just one big distraction. The big one, of course, is the “pivot/re-balance to the Asia-Pacific.” In the wake of James Foley’s beheading by the ISIS, General Dempsey started his part of last week’s DOD press conference, not by speaking about the ISIS, but by discussing his recent trip to Vietnam, the first by a Joint Chiefs chairman in decades. The administration has faced setbacks to their Asia policy, but this, when paired with things you probably haven’t read about like this, this and this, is a sign that this “pivot” which pundits have criticized as “hollow” is more than just words. It’s for real and it’s strategic priority #1 for the Administration. We’re doing it the Chinese way: slowly, patiently and subtlety. And Obama wants people to understand that.
You can find a lot online about the Executive Branch’s remarks about the ISIS. For one, the President has called them a “cancer” that must be rooted out; Secretary Kerry tweeted that “ISIL must be destroyed/will be crushed,” and Secretary Hagel remarked that ISIS is a threat unlike anything we’ve seen before. So what must be done?
In the long run, President Obama’s remarks about the ISIS hold some truth; this group, and the wave of Salafi jihadism will burn itself out, that “People like this fail…because the future is always won by those who build, not destroy.” But we would be naive to expect it to recede anytime soon. It is possible that the ISIS can be crushed in what time remains of President Obama’s second term, while defeating Salafi jihadism itself is far more ambitious. But refusing to use the time between now and January 2017 to fight the ISIS will not only give them time to grow, it would also be irresponsible.
Paul Pillar’s piece this week rightly points out that the keys to the ISIS’s destruction lie within its own unique methods and objectives. For example, one thing that distinguishes the ISIS from other organizations is this “caliphate” they established, their conquered territory, which spans from Syria to Northwestern Iraq. It is essential to keep in mind that this “caliphate” exists in a desert region which offers few places to hide and where clear skies permit constant, pitiless bombing. What will be challenging is when they wise up and take refuge among regional towns and cities.
Airpower is only useful when forces move through open terrain. Bombing more populated areas is fine and everything, but it just so happens to be frowned up by 21st Century standards. Kurdish militias like the Peshmerga and a few battle-hardened Shia militia and Iraqi Military brigades have been able to fight back with some help from U.S. airstrikes, but their ability to seek out and defeat the group is still a big unknown.
Success against the Islamic State is going to require renewed help from the people of Iraq and Syria a la 2003 to provide human, local, on the ground, intelligence; this is known as HUMINT, or “human intelligence.” HUMINT can’t be gathered from a drone (that’s IMINT and in some cases SIGINT), nor can it be gathered from the business end of a cruise missile (that’s BOOMINT. Just kidding I made that one up). You get the point; the lynchpin for any measurable success against a group like the ISIS requires firing up our old intelligence networks in Iraq or building new ones. It is going to require these guys, and there are rumors circulating that the band is getting back together again. If that’s true, the ISIS had better watch out.
So in short, Western airpower and Special Forces which empowers and aids locals, can set the stage for the strategic defeat of the ISIS. But a permanent solution to the problem would require local actors to step up. And not just the government in Baghdad and regional leaders in Iraq; putting pressure on regional partners and allies to help is equally crucial. Many radicalized westerners have been attending SCIS (Summer Camp In Syria) via Turkey to join the ISIS.
If I didn’t know any better, I’d say Syria’s border with Turkey seems like a safe place for these guys to operate, arm and organize.
We must find ways to compel the Turkish government to make good on their NATO membership and secure their border. The Gulf States are also a key set of regional partners that must understand that their lackluster attitude towards money-laundering schemes and terrorist funding is unacceptable, and the ISIS, and groups like them, are awash in cash because of it; they must crack down on their citizens funneling money through Kuwait that support Salafi jihad.
Bomb ISIS, Help Assad
Another key factor to decisively defeating the ISIS is defeating them in Syria. General Dempsey, Chairman of the JCS admits this, and earlier this week, President Obama reportedly ordered surveillance flights over eastern Syria this week to give the U.S. some better sense of what’s happening on the ground. These could lay the groundwork for airstrikes in Syria similar to what American planes have dropped on Iraq. The timing of all this couldn’t be more ironic: Exactly a year ago this week we were waiting to see if the U.S. would bomb Syria (Assad), but this week in August 2014 we’re waiting to see if the U.S. will bomb Syria (ISIS).
The West may have to at least entertain the thought of living with, and possibly even working with, a Syrian and an Iranian regime they have for years sought to remove. In international relations, it’s sometimes like family: you don’t get to pick them.
If we bomb Syria, who are our allies on the ground that would fill the void and retake the territory? The moderate groups in Free Syrian Army? I’m still waiting for someone to tell me what that actually means. Al Nusra Front, the al-Qaeda affiliate? Or is it Assad? If we attack the ISIS in Syria it looks like that means we’d be helping Assad. And if we’re helping Assad, what kind of message does that send, when our administration repeatedly calls for regime change? That if you’re a homicidal autocrat and you yell “terrorist!” loud enough, the U.S. won’t just work with you, it’ll work for you. Are we prepared to step back from our policy of “Assad must go“?
We have to try and also think not just about who we’d be fighting against, in this case the ISIS, but also about who we’d be fighting for as a consequence, in this case Assad. We have to tread carefully. Any notion that we’d be working with Assad, a Shia dictator, would be a propaganda goldmine for Sunnis worldwide. We would also indirectly be empowering Hezbollah, a Shia terrorist group and Iranian proxy. Moreover, there are reports circulating that Assad’s strategy from the get-go was detente with the ISIS; he leaves them alone while they kill off the other rebel groups fighting against him. In short, it looks like Assad has allowed these radicals to thrive in order to demonstrate his own value to the U.S. Not bad for an ophthalmologist who never wanted to be president of Syria in the first place.
Aside from the above-mentioned concerns, I think an analogy can be made here. Consider FDR’s allying with the Soviet Union. Joseph Stalin, a homicidal maniac, was used to defeat what was perceived as a mutual, shared threat. There was an implicit understanding that we wouldn’t be buddy buddies after the war, but eliminating Nazi Germany was in both of our national interests. We did business with Joseph Stalin, but we never trusted Joseph Stalin. Which brings me to my next analogy. Observe below. Skip to 01:55 and stop it at 02:23
Michael Corleone: C’mon Frankie… my father did business with Hyman Roth, he respected Hyman Roth.
Frank Pentangeli: Your father did business with Hyman Roth, he respected Hyman Roth… but he never *trusted* Hyman Roth!
Point is, we’ve played this game before. A lot. If an understanding is made with Assad, it doesn’t have to be advertised. In fact, the White House repeatedly denies that it will work with Assad in rooting out the ISIS in Syria. We don’t have to trust them, but we may have to work with them. Or work alongside them, however the Obama Administration wants to phrase it.
The other elephant in the room is Iran. We cannot talk about dealing with the ISIS without Iran in the equation. In fact, there is a slow, gradual process of detente between the U.S. and Iran that some analysts see as inevitable. They can help, but what will it cost? Here’s what I think they want in return: no more sanctions and a wink and nod to stop hampering their nuclear programme. It may sound ridiculous, but even if we end up not budging on those things, the thought exercise lends itself to an important lesson: no situation being dealt with can be handled in a vacuum. Things you perceive as unrelated could be the deal breaker for the other guy. We have to be careful when we compartmentalize issues. This not only applies internationally but domestically too.
To an outside observer like myself, the bright idea factory looks like it’s putting out a lot of smoke, but no one is offering policy and strategy options. Let’s ease back on the rhetoric and think this one through, even if it means not talking about the ISIS for a while. These guys couldn’t imagine, nor afford, the western media PR campaign that is currently covering them. They aren’t the world’s first militant organization, and they certainly won’t be the last.
With summer right around the corner and folks taking some vacation, Mexico is a popular spot. Matter of fact, my mother just went to a wedding at Los Cabos in Baja, California and my sister is going to Cancun for her honeymoon in a few weeks. Mexico, and Latin America for that matter, was my “first [academic] love,” the first region that I delved into while studying International Relations. And surprisingly, I haven’t talked about Mexico at ALL. This post then, is long overdue.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Mexico’s President Enrique Pena Nieto met at Los Pinos Presidential Residence in Mexico City on May 21, 2014
Secretary of State John Kerry has visited 48 countries and traveled almost 500,000 miles. But until he arrived in Mexico last Wednesday, he had not visited the United States’ closest neighbors, Mexico.
At first glance, Mexico has nothing going for it. It has few navigable rivers and few good natural ports (Verazcruz is perhaps the best one). To make matters worse, it has many disassociated territories, along with lots of highland jungle and deserts. This in of itself may lead you to believe that it will never be a strong state. It probably should be a failed state, but thankfully, it’s nearest neighbor is the global superpower. It has access to income and access to markets that it wouldn’t have had otherwise had it not been for their proximity to the United States. More importantly for the purposes of this blog post, it has access to a drug consuming population that it wouldn’t have had otherwise. Mexico has gone from an economic footnote, to perhaps the next big thing. And by mid-century, the country will be stronger than ever. Mexico is on track to becoming the next China.
Mexico’s Geographical Challenge:
Mexico has some of the worst types of terrain in which you can develop a successful economy and culture with. Here, there are few areas where you don’t need irrigation, and unlike our chunks of arable land in the U.S., Mexico’s is much more dispersed. None of these arable chunks of land in Mexico are connected. That means any piece of infrastructure you build has to be built everywhere else, making it difficult to get any leverage. The climate also make transport issues difficult. As a result Mexico will always be capital poor with substandard infrastructure.
Land Use in Mexico Most of Mexico is highland or mountainous and less than 15% of the land is arable; about 25% of the country is forested. Dark Purple: Land suitable for intensive farming, has irrigation infrastructure. Light Purple: Farm with limited infrastructure for temporary/light farming. Gray: Limited farming, no irrigation infrastructure. Brown: Farm livestock, limited infrastructure. Light gray: Suitable for farm livestock or limited irrigation project. Yellow: With or without livestock limited infrastructure for livestock. Not suitable for farming. Green: Forest with limited or no infrastructure. Not suitable for farming.
The Good News (What does Mexico have going for it?):
Despite all of this, Mexico will be the fastest growing economy for the next three decades. Mexico is already the world’s 15th largest economy; in the next 20 years it’ll probably be in the top ten. And that’s WITHOUT the drug war ending and WITHOUT having a corrupt government. There are certain things that are just hardwired into the system. Right now, monkeys can run Mexico and it will probably end up the same way.
The United States has tripled its natural gas exports to Mexico in the last decade, and we’re going to triple that again in the next four years. There are 9 trunk-lines under construction right now with an target completion date of 2017. Texas won’t just be feeding Juarez with energy; pretty soon it will be powering Mexico City and Veracruz. Thank you, shale. And this is all without the recent reforms that Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto signed into law that changes the constitution to allow foreign companies to drill for oil and gas.
Mexico also has favorable demographics, with lots of young workers and a large consumption base, largely propelled by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). And as horrible and violent as the drug war has been, it has pushed down Mexican labor costs; they are now cheaper than China’s. Anywhere else in the world this wouldn’t work very well, but because they are so close to the U.S. this labor differential works in their favor. The bigger that differential is, the more investors look at Mexico and see it as an attractive market to leverage its labor capacities to service the American market. So I know this sounds crazy, but the worse the drug war gets in Mexico, the better it is for FDI. Foreigners can come in, metabolize the cheap labor, and sell things to the U.S. because of it. This is the second largest bilateral economic relationship in human history. By 2020 I expect it to be the largest. As of right now the Mexican-American border is already the most crossed border in human history; last year it had 350 million legal border crossings. It’s not that the Americans haven’t decided if we want to integrate with Mexico, it’s that we don’t know what to do about it yet.
The blue areas are the largest concentrations of Hispanic populations. While this map is telling, not in this map are the %increases of Hispanics which are over 50% almost all across the United States.
The Bad News (You Can’t Spell “Mexico” Without “Drug war”):
The Mexicans are the only people in the world who can WALK to the United States. In every country you have cultures that can physically transport themselves and set up ghettos en masse. Here, we only have Mexicans and Central Americans; all of our ghetto populations are Hispanic. That complicates things a little, since drug runners started entering the United States through Mexico after we effectively cut off their transit routes to Miami via the Caribbean. The problem is when the ghetto issue and the drug transport issues coalesce.
Mexico’s land border with the US is 2,000 miles long. Even if the US put all of its troops on the border right now, that’s only 1 for every 50 feet.
We are seeing signs of this coalescence, as well as the TCOs’ diversification and expansion. Just last week, New York City officials seized over 50 pounds of heroin that dealers were attempting to move from New England. Yes, New York City. The flood of heroin coming in and out of New York City has surged to its highest levels since 1991, alarming law enforcement who say that bigger players – like Mexican Transnational Criminal Organizations (“TCOs)– are now entering the market.
You know them as “drug cartels” but I call them TCOs because they have diversified; they are not just drug-running cartels anymore. They’ve gone UP the supply chain to South America and contracted directly with the cocoa producers. And now they’re coming DOWN the supply chain to the United States. They can move anything now: drugs, money, guns, people, even oil. See, these “cartel wars” are not necessarily about drugs; they’re about transport routes and networks. It’s about geography. The logical conclusion is that this “drug war” will spill over into the United States as they fight each other for these networks. And in many ways it already has. Mexican TCOs are now the dominant organized crime group in 1,000 municipalities and operate in more than 230 American cities, from San Diego to Boston.
And because we don’t have an immigration policy to integrate these ghetto populations, we’ve provided the cartels with exactly what they need to spread. And they are kicking the American gangs’ asses. In ten years time the current U.S. gangs – the Bloods and the Crips just won’t exist anymore, because the TCOs will have killed them all. They will take over retail drug distribution. And then they will begin fighting each other, just as they have been in Mexico.
We are worried about Syria, Ukraine and Afghanistan, but are we prepared for Mexican TCOs infiltrating the Spanish speaking ghettos in every major city and bringing the North American drug war here? This is something I don’t think we can fuhgettabout.
We all know the North Koreans have a thing for the theatrics. Heated rhetoric comes from them all the time. In fact, just the other day, North Korean state media referred to Obama as a “monkey” and the South Korean President as an “old prostitute.” This rhetoric, coupled with the long history of escapades, like the satellite launch in 2012, firing rockets into the sea and thereby restarting Caligula’s ancient war with Poseidon, and constant threats of nuclear testing, has long been used by the North Korean leaders to bolster their regime internally. Defying the great enemy that is the West, despite decades of international isolation and hardship is a North Korean pastime. But this is nothing new; North Korea and even their northern neighbors, the People’s Republic of China (China/PRC) have a long history of capitalizing on issues and events to use as propaganda to bolster their governments.
The camp teams battled it out in track-and-field events, soccer, boxing, and wrestling, as well as American football, and softball.
During the Cold War, both North Korea and China made great efforts to convey that they were great countries to live in, perhaps even a paradise. During the Korean War in particular, they tried to deflect accusations from the international community that their U.N. prisoners were being mistreated. Most people remember that the first Olympic Games held on the Korean peninsula were in Seoul, in the summer of 1988, but they are mistaken. After the official 1952 Summer Olympics were held in Helsinki, Finland in July, North Korea and the PRC created an alternative Olympic Games at a North Korean POW camp in Pyuktong. Prison camps near the Yalu River in North Korea competed in teams made up of men from the United States, Britain, South Korea, Turkey, France, the Philippines, and the Netherlands. The camp teams battled it out in track-and-field events, soccer, boxing, and wrestling, as well as American football, and softball, all during the harsh North Korean winter. It would have many names, but it would be known as the Inter Camp Olympics. The Korean War has been dubbed the “Forgotten War,” but even those that remember it are not aware of this bizarre event. This is an obscure, yet fascinating event during the Korean War with which there is so little information.
Many studies of POWs during the Korean War include the infamous Clarence Adams, an African American POW from Memphis, Tennessee. He was one of the twenty-one Americans who decided to start a new life and live in the PRC, refusing repatriation after the armistice (yes, we’re still technically at war with North Korea).(1) His motives and experiences in China are often the most cited, but no one to my knowledge has ever cited his participation in the POW Olympics. He was in Camp 5, one of the several camps that participated in the games. We are aware of the death marches, the torture, and the poor treatment of POWs committed by the North Koreans in the early years of the war; Adams recalled how he weighed roughly 100 pounds. However, he observed that treatment improved after the Chinese took over their camp:
The Chinese took over Camp 5 in the spring of 1951 and introduced what they called their “lenient policy.” They lined us all up and told us that although they were not bound by the Geneva Convention, they had their own policy of leniency that would greatly improve our lives in the camp…and gradually it did. (2)
Adams cited the racial discrimination he and fellow African Americans faced as a major reason for staying on in a new socialist country. He ended up returning to the U.S., fleeing China during the Cultural Revolution.
The treatment of POWs in the North somewhat improved when the peace talks at Panmunjom started, when the Chinese adopted their “lenient policy.” From his account we learn that the Chinese were fairly reasonable in providing POWs with some level of comfort and normalcy, but it is unclear as to whether this is genuine, given that their new policy started right around the peace talks. Adams records that the Chinese:
…agreed to everything I asked for. After a couple of months, they brought in bats and baseballs, footballs, books, boxing gloves, parallel bars…We set up cooking and sanitation committees. We exercised every day. And the guys began to get stronger. We even got some medicine that we gave to the prisoners who were medics to administer… (3)
Along with beginning to see conditions improving in the camp, Adams is the only American POW that I found that definitively recorded the Inter Camp Olympics in a printed memoir:
A welcome interlude occurred in our daily lives with the Inter Camp P.O.W. Olympics, held in November 15-27, 1952, in Pyuktong, just outside of Camp 5. This was a time of heated negotiations, and the Chinese obviously hoped to gain positive worldwide publicity for hosting these games. Some prisoners refused to participate, but others…welcomed this diversion from the tedium of their daily lives, as well as the chance to talk to their buddies from other camps. (4)
Adams observed that several hundred POWs participated and competed in many sports, including “football, baseball, softball, basketball, volleyball, track and field, soccer, gymnastics, and of course boxing, where I fought as a lightweight.” We learn earlier in his memoir that he was an avid boxer. He must have been thrilled to be able to box competitively again, perhaps a reason why he never viewed the event in a negative light. From his recollection we learn that the Chinese put on quite a show, and tried to make it as grandiose and organized as possible: “We had our own photographers, announcers, and even reporters who put out a newspaper called the “Olympic Roundup” after each day’s events…It was great fun and made us forget about where we were for at least a few days.” (5)
Adams mentioned a newspaper called “Olympic Roundup” that was printed at the camp during the games, which brought me to a treasure of a website that I intend to continue analyzing in the future. Its contents include a brochure/pamphlet that was produced, courtesy of the People’s Republic of China, shortly after the Inter Camp Olympics; the extent to which it was distributed is unknown, but its contents were scanned and copied onto this website, courtesy of a group of British Korean War veterans.(6) The pamphlet includes a wealth of information, ranging from pictures of the sporting events and ceremonies, and every piece of information is straight from “Olympic Roundup,” which was written by the POWs covering the games. In the records of participants it lists Clarence Adams as one of the 22 competitors (with their serial numbers) in the boxing tournament. Pictures from the newspaper are also shown, and some the clippings described the significance of the event:
…I can say that in all the history of prisoner-of-war life, this sort of thing never happened before…it was the most colorful and gala event to come about during our stay here in Korea under the guidance of our captors…I am certain that no one in his sane mind will ever say that prisoners of war here are not the best cared for in the whole world today. May the peoples all the world over be informed of that First Inter-Camp Olympics Meet, 1952…
Another one goes further: “…It’s a pity, that the same atmosphere doesn’t prevail over all the world, because if so then how pleasant and peaceful life would be for us all.” The purpose of this pamphlet, like any pamphlet, was for distribution. However, discerning the audience is difficult; Since this is one of the only surviving records of such a piece, it is possible that it was distributed as a souvenir for POWs to take back home. It is also not clear if it was distributed in China, or if they were flown and dropped over U.N. territory to convince Western troops how much fun their POW friends were having while they were freezing in a foxhole.
The irony in all of this of course is that everyone who participated in this event, from those you see smiling and competing with each other in sports uniforms (see pictures at the end), to those that wrote and recorded the event in the newspaper, were captives. The writing in the newspapers that were meant for distribution is full of praise, to convince participants that maybe the Communist governments were not so bad after all.(7) The general consensus is that the event was used as a propaganda ploy, and participants had to have been well aware of this. In a paper written to describe life in POW camps for Marines during the War, Colonel James Angus MacDonald mentions the Games in a few pages (out of several hundred). In it he quotes an Air Force pilot who described a Major Thomas D. Harrison, who I was able to cross-reference with the pamphlet website and confirm that he played basketball as a participant in the Olympics:
…he attended an athletic meet in Pyoktong. While there, his skill as an athlete helped restore the prestige of the officers torn down by the enemy’s propaganda. In addition he defied the guards by circulating among the enlisted men and pointing out lies contained in the enemy propaganda designed to slander this country…at the same time he collected the names of many prisoners held in isolated places whom it was suspected that the enemy might attempt to hold after the end of the war. (8)
It’s no surprise that we learned about the considerable efforts made by the Chinese to indoctrinate younger enlisted men.(9) After fielding several interviews with which he provides no transcript, Colonel MacDonald also described the discernment process that other POW Camps went through before finally deciding to participate in these Olympics. He concluded that normally they would have withdrew their participation, due to the potential the event had for being used as propaganda, but “…in the end, the possibility for making contact with other camps and exchanging vital information proved the deciding factor.”(10) This corroborates with Clarence Adam’s testimony earlier when he mentioned that it was a way for prisoners at other camps to see their buddies.
In November 1952, in the region of Pyoktong in North Korea, hundreds of United Nations prisoners captured during two years of fighting were brought together to compete in the “Inter Camp Olympics.” But who could blame prisoners for participating in such an event? Regardless if the whole thing was used for propaganda, in a way, everyone got what they wanted. Furthermore, it wouldn’t exactly be untrue if a majority of the captives enjoyed it. The fact that they were able to compete in physically strenuous events suggests that they were indeed treated at least with some level of nourishment. The extent to which the Communists were able to convert prisoners to their cause was only limited to the likes of Clarence Adams, who were halfway there since they had their grievances about their home country prior to serving as an Allied combatant. The Chinese and North Koreans could say that they were treating the captives well, and the POWs got a chance to see their comrades and live in better conditions for 2 weeks. For the POWs, this was a valuable diversion to the morale-draining prisoner life. In short, it was a fantasy for both parties involved.
Two years ago was not only the year of the 2012 Summer Olympics at London; that November also marked the 60th anniversary of these Inter Camp Olympics. And although the Korean War is a dim memory in much of the world today, perhaps a detailed account of a Communist propaganda exercise, their answer to the real Olympics Games and indeed, one of the strangest events ever to have occurred during wartime, will spark a renewed interest in the conflict whose consequences reverberate on the Peninsula and beyond to this day.
(1) Clarence Adams. An American Dream: The Life of an African American Soldier and POW Who Spent Twelve Years in Communist China. Ed. Della Adams and Lewis H. Carlson. Amherst: University of Massachusetts, 2007. Print.
Their defection was regarded as a major public relations victory for the Communists, but Adams never considered himself a turncoat. We can sympathize with him in the sense that he knew that there would be no life for him back in the States; he was a poor black man who would inevitably return to the 1950s South. Eventually he abandoned his life in China and returned to the U.S.
(2) Ibid., 51.
(3) Ibid., 56. We must take Adams words here with some level of suspicion. We learn in his memoir that the found Chinese re-education classes given at his camp compelling, and he was a regular contributor to their propaganda newspaper. As a representative of the camp, perhaps the Chinese thought that if they worked with Adams and gave him some authority he would be swayed to come to their side. Although he never says this outright, his defection points to this being a possibility.
(7) Culturally, although they abandoned some of their old ways in favor of Communism, the Confucian ideology stresses to never express your true intentions and emotions outright, and if you must, to do it ever so subtly.
(9) Historical records show that these subversive activities were not only done by the Chinese themselves, but by Western prisoners like Clarence Adams who were labeled as “Progressives” and were sympathetic to the criticisms of their own country.
Whenever I’m perplexed after reading something in the news, I typically turn to a much older set of papers for some context and sometimes, for some inspiration. As told by Thucydides:
The good faith, Lacedaemonians, which characterizes your political conduct and private intercourse towards each other, makes you the less disposed to hearken to what may be said to the prejudice of others; and from this, indeed, you derive a sober-minded moderation, butyou labour always under a great misconception of the affairs of other States.
Thucydides was recounting the Corinthians’ address to the Spartan Senate, where they were comparing the Spartans with the Athenians. To the Corinthians, Sparta assumes that since they have a working constitution and a way of life that suits them well, they do not have to change their ways to confront this new issue: the growth of Athenian power. While this attitude is seen as being “moderate,” the Corinthians point out that this shows a kind of ignorance when it comes to foreign affairs.
Whether this account of the Corinthians addressing the Spartan Senate is 100% accurate or not is inconsequential. What it reveals though, is a recurring pattern in History: States and their leaders, try as they may, often misunderstand or do not consider the goals, actions and intentions of other States and their leaders. What does this have to do with Russia?
The idea that allowing the Russians to hold onto the Crimea suggests some huge decline in American power is strange, considering that in 1989, the United States’ power only reached as far as Bavaria; and if you look at the map below this one, you’ll see that it now surrounds Russia on almost all sides.
We’ve treated the Russians as a potential threat since the 90s. We’ve expanded NATO to its doorstep, and we’re working on building missile defense systems in Eastern Europe, all to their protest. And then comes Ukraine, where the U.S. and a coalition of Western governments backed and encouraged protesters that led to the overthrow of a sitting president that kept close ties with Russia, which was soon replaced by an interim government hostile to Russia. What did Putin think about all of that? Could this happen to his own government; was Kyiv a dress rehearsal for Moscow? I suppose you’ll have to ask Putin himself, but it’s likely that he at least entertained the thought.
You’d expect American policymakers to at least try to understand Russian concerns about Ukraine joining an alliance with traditionally adversarial powers (i.e. greater cooperation with the E.U. and NATO). Obama pundits have made the argument that the President invited this crisis in Ukraine because he didn’t take a firmer stance on Syria and chose to pull out of Iraq. This is absolutely ridiculous. Even if Obama had bombed Syria, he still would be faced with this situation in Ukraine, and he would have been holding the same cards. Perhaps pundits forget that the last President’s “firm stance,” a rapid expansion of the National Security state and invading two countries, did not stop Putin from invading Georgia. Russia’s move in Georgia in ’08 and Crimea today is understandable if you accept that most powers do not like hostile governments on their borders and that most powers are always looking to maintain or grow their sphere of influence. After all, the United States is deeply committed to the Monroe Doctrine, which warns other great powers to stay out of the Western Hemisphere, or else. Like how Canada and Mexico are to us, Georgia and Ukraine aren’t just any states close to Russia’s neighborhood; they’re on its doorstep. Over here, we live in a country with the Atlantic to our West, the Pacific to our East, Mexico at the bottom and Canada at the top. That’s geography, and it’s not changing. We have it pretty good over here. If you’re Russia though, with Germany and NATO on one side, China on the other, and Japan breathing down your neck, it’s a different story altogether.
So the polls are in and we moved to another stage of this Crimean crisis: the Crimean Parliament declared independence from Ukraine, 97% of Crimean voters favored joining Russia, the Parliament formally asked Russia to join the Russian Federation, and the Kremlin signed legislation sealing the deal. Crimea is gone. Whatever comes next, we have few options to “punish” Russia, at least in the short term, and Putin knows it.
For one, the Europeans aren’t super excited about “crippling” sanctions; London and Cyrpus really like all of that Russian money in its banking system, and from what I’ve gathered, major arteries that feed Europe’s natural gas supply flow through Ukraine, from Russia. And all of the Western governments are trying to pass legislation to secure a bailout for Ukraine, but when has our Congress ever agreed on anything, especially when right now we’re looking for things to cut, not add to, the deficit? And if the history of sanctions has taught us anything, it’s that regimes are willing to endure a tremendous amount of pain to secure what they see as their vital interests.
Germany relies on Russia for three-quarters of its oil and gas imports. Sanctions on Russia could be painful for everyone.
That doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t implement the tools that we have and are willing to use. But it seems to me there’s little we can do about Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Economic sanctions? Installing missile defense systems in Eastern Europe? Seizing assets of Putin’s friends? Giving the Ukrainians foreign aid [and who aren’t exactly innocent in this affair, and are only united by their hatred for Yanukovych and Putin]? Go for it. But the reality is we’re not going to war over Crimea, and Obama has publicly stated that we will not go to war over Ukraine.
Don’t get me wrong; I’m not saying Russia is “back.” Mitt Romney’s comment on Russia being America’s “number one geopolitical foe” falls short (but Obama was also wrong to snub him the way that he did). This is not to say that Russia doesn’t matter, but let’s not give them too much credit: Russia may be playing geopolitical chess, but he’s playing defense. This move in Crimea was a move made from weakness. Ukraine has slowly been moving away from Russia, and inching toward the West. The West hasn’t lost Ukraine. Europe hasn’t lost Ukraine. The United States hasn’t lost Ukraine. Putin lost Ukraine, and he knows it. So to save face he took a short term gain (Crimea, and saber rattling towards Eastern Ukraine) but a long term loss, and Russian influence over the rest of Europe will suffer.
Formal Ukrainian elections are going to be held in May, and it’s unlikely that any new government will be a Yanukovych; but that doesn’t mean it shouldn’t be respectful to its [Russian] minorities and nudge Russia on with provocative gestures. The reality is that the stability of Ukraine cannot be guaranteed with at least some level of cooperation with Russia. After all, Ukraine is “the borderland.” Point is, we can talk about punishing Russia all we want, but decent relations with Moscow are imperative. We need their help with Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, and soon, maybe even China. Anyone who thinks this is just about Ukraine has to stop thinking like a lawyer and more like a strategist. Thucydides would’ve understood that.
Sidenote: Though the current crisis in Ukraine is complex, we should remember that everything can always be worse. As per an agreement signed in Budapest in 1994, Ukraine has gotten rid of all their nuclear weapons, and just two years ago eliminated all of their weapons-grade materiel. A document signed 20 years ago prevented this from becoming a nuclear crisis. And now that’s one less thing we have to think about.
David Kessler and Peter Kouretsos – Happy New Year, everybody! Big things happened in 2013: Dave and I graduated in May and we’re all still here, which means that the world didn’t blow itself up. And to us here at the Brooklyn Diplomat, that’s a reassuring sign that we’re doing ok and that it could always be worse. Not great, but ok. It helps us put things into perspective. But we digress. We’ve been reading lots of articles lately about what to expect in 2014, and while we’ve found some of the trends, forecasts and “predictions” out there to be agreeable and insightful, the overall impression we got can only be described by one of our favorite movies (because Brooklyn, that’s why)
Ok, maybe not exactly BS, but lots of this stuff seemed pretty obvious. It’s not very Brooklyn at all. And as the official trendsetter of the modern world, the gentlemen and scholars of Brooklyn ought to have a say in what to expect in a post 2013 world. Main takeaway from all of what you’re about to read right now: Foreign policy. Start caring about it. While last year’s headlines were dominated by economics, just one look at any of the headlines this past month shows that 2014 will be a “Foreign Policy” year. This is what Dave and I are thinking about now as we begin 2014. At the end, we’ll also share with you our New Year’s resolutions.
First Up: PETER KOURETSOS
#5) MENA unrest expands:
2014 is going to be a record year for violence in Iraq (a great primer can be found here). Runner ups in terms of unrest and instability are going to be obvious, Egypt and Libya, where the money is running out and the governments being propped up at the moment simply are not working. There are also serious concerns of a security vacuum in Afghanistan with talks of a U.S. 2014 pullout if a Bilateral Security Agreement doesn’t get hammered out; failure here would mean Afghanistan spirals back to the way it was before the 2001 invasion and we’re back to square one.
Adding fuel to the fire in Egypt, the interim government backed by Sisi (who may very well run for President soon) and the SCAF recently declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Both the Brotherhood and the government have reached a point of no return. By labeling the Brotherhood a terrorist organization and denying them any political voice, they’ve committed themselves to stamping them out for good; or risk them returning to power and destroying them. The Brotherhood, now backed into a corner, doesn’t have much to lose. And when one group has everything to lose while another has nothing to lose, it rarely ends well. It’s a very desperate situation. It’s a very…Syria(ous) situation…
Al-Qaeda is certainly not what it used to be after bin Laden’s death, but that does not necessarily make it weaker or stronger; it just makes it different. And if we don’t adapt to that, “different” will become “dangerous.”
2014 will be a “good” year for al Qaeda. We will see a proliferation of small, local al Qaeda “units” that will take the jihad locally. This is not to say that some groups won’t target the U.S. directly anymore, but the emphasis will be local, where they can take advantage of economic hardship, weak, ineffective and unresponsive governance, and social unrest. They have, for example, used Western Syria as a haven to launch operations into Iraq’s Anbar province, most notably in Fallujah.
Violence will grow and al Qaeda and its affiliates will grow. The willingness of the U.S. and the Allies to devote significant resources to deal with these threats is not what it used to be (as opposed to right after 9/11). To make matters more troublesome, the capacity for local governments and “partners” to pick up the slack simply isn’t there. Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan are bursting at the seams and risk becoming more unstable as they take in more refugees from the Syrian war, which is not ending any time soon. If you want to know whether this new decentralized and fragmented al Qaeda is weaker or stronger than it was before Osama bin Laden’s death, you’re asking the wrong question. It is certainly not what it used to be, but that does not necessarily make it weaker or stronger; it just makes it different. In the environment described above, the so-called “al Qaeda 2.0” after 2011 becomes “al Qaeda 3.0” in 2014.
#4) Consequences of an Iran deal:
As per the accord hammered out last November, Iran has halted its 20% enrichment and just began blending down its stockpile of 20% enriched uranium this January. The West has made good on their end of the bargain by lifting some sanctions.
Hassan Rouhani was elected for this very reason. Sanctions were biting and he has been tasked to stop the bleeding. He does not have the go-ahead from the Ayatollahs to completely eliminate enrichment, but the momentum is there in 2014 for a deal with limited enrichment in exchange for a seat as a member of the international community.
We will find very soon whether a nuclear deal with Iran is going to happen, maybe even by the end of the first quarter. If it does, oil prices could take a hit when Iranian crude enters the market and the Saudis, Venezuelans and Russians will find themselves in a very difficult position. Petroleum exports account for a disproportionate amount of their national revenues because they have chosen not to diversify, mainly because they just never saw the need to. Will they decrease production (and lower exports) to keep prices where they’re at now, or do they continue at current production levels and watch prices fall?
Either way, if a deal with Iran happens this year, the funds used to grease the wheels of these petro-states could begin to dry up. But if a deal does not occur, oil prices could spike, the potential for an Israeli strike will go up, the risk of other MENA states going nuclear goes up and the Iranians move much more quickly to a nuclear “breakout” capability.
3) Elections happening just about everywhere:
I know people are talking about U.S. Midterm Elections and are also on the lookout for anyone announcing a 2016 Presidential run, but I’ll let Dave take that one. Pretty much any emerging market most investors have been talking about that can have elections this year is having elections. China is the exception here since they don’t have elections. I am also not counting Russia in this either.
A little under half of the world’s population will vote some time in 2014. The Economist breaks it down for you.
When I’m talking emerging markets I’m talking Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Columbia, Turkey (a full list here). Many of these large economies have one thing in common: most of the parties in power now have been in power for more than a decade. And for at least the past 10 years, the effectiveness of their governance has been questionable. These countries are at a crossroads; a case in point is Turkey. PM Erdogan must step down due to term limits but he can still win and hold the ceremonial office of President this year; we could see a Prime Minister-President seat-holding scenario similar to Putin’s Russia with Dmitry Medvedev. But Erdogan’s AKP will still need to win local elections, and though they are still generally popular, recent discontent with the AKP’s strongarm tactics and a political crisis sparked by the Gezi Park protests could lose them some seats.
Brazil is another notable country with major elections to watch, and the World Cup (plus with the Olympics two years away) will add more to its complexity. President Dilma Rousseff’s party will likely stay in 2014, but only because Latin American politics as a whole is uniquely more populist and often lacks strong opposition parties. Economic growth has also plummeted while public funds have been used to prepare the country for the World Cup and the Olympics. Extravagant stadiums next to run-down favelas will present the world with a Latin American version of Charles Dickens’ “A Tale of Two Cities.”
And as for the most populous Muslim country in the world in the ever-growing and important Southeast Asian region, Indonesia undergoes both Presidential and Parliamentary elections; it would do the United States some good if they re-engaged and reaffirmed their commitment to an Asia-Pacific “pivot.” And although the popular topic right now is Ukraine, all eyes will be on Thailand as it navigates a political crisis between rival factions; it’s unlikely that an election will solve anything without an agreement between the clashing parties, and the risk of a military coup is always there.
#2 )Reforming China:
The Peoples Republic of China’s (PRC) Third Plenum launched significant and unprecedented political reforms that will fundamentally alter how China is governed. In 2014 we will see the beginning of those, and consequently, the beginning of a new China. I’m still optimistic about China in 2014; the PRC’s resilience amid the decades of challenges it’s faced has been far too consistent to bet against.
By a show of hands, who’s betting against China in 2014? Nobody? Ok, cool, just making sure.
In Xi Jinping’s first year of governance, he’s engaged in more reform than in the PRC’s past 20 years. This means real economic reform, a free-trade zone in Shanghai, anti-corruption moves, things that will get China on track for a serious restructuring. But reform in China will make lots of people who have an interest in the status quo very unhappy. The Plenum was meant for Xi to consolidate as much power for himself to strong-arm these things through. The core issues and problems have never been external for China. They have always been about, well…China. China’s core interests have always been domestic security and national unity. In fact, the new National Security body that was established after the Plenum, unlike ours, is focused on cracking down on internal matters like corruption, protests and unrest in the countryside.
China has greatly benefited from globalization, but they also have a long history of getting hurt when they expose themselves too much to the whims of other nations and foreign-based corporations that want to do business there. The Opium Wars and the Unequal Treaty system during the 19th and early 20th centuries are the most popular examples of this. This is why China has and will always be wary of any “comprehensive” and “binding” trade agreements and other multilateral treaties. China would much rather negotiate bilaterally, with one nation at a time, and on its own terms. So although the Bali talks and Doha give me hope for comprehensive international trade agreements, I’m not expecting China to commit to anything like it in 2014.
And if things get uneasy internally for China, with discontent and nationalism coming to a head, count on Xi and the Party to release some steam from the tea kettle and deflect those energies towards Japan and its neighbors who are suspicious of a more aggressive China. And in this kind of pressure-cooker environment, with all of their history and provoking the risk for a showdown with the Japanese as the Chinese reform process beings is real.
#1)The U.S. walks alone
The U.S. walks alone at the start of 2014, but it’s never time for it to throw in the towel. 2014 is a pivotal foreign policy year, and if they play their cards right, the United States can mitigate 2014’s risks and repair the damages of 2013.
Ok, Geopolitics 101 stipulates that there are exceptions to this: the British, the Canadians, the Mexicans and the Israelis. These relationships are maintained because of strategic choice and necessity, although there have been discussions about Israel’s discomfort with their U.S. relationship as of late.
Those exceptions aside, I am seeing signs that we’re beginning to live in a world where U.S. Foreign Policy has become less clear and less certain and decisive. Our cuts in Defense and foreign aid make the rest of the world uneasy, and question our commitments. We’re also beginning to taper, and the money that used to float around and find its way to other nations’ markets isn’t going to be there anymore. All other countries tied to the U.S. are concerned and are questioning the traditional terms of their relationship: South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brazil, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Germany and France come to mind. This includes trying to move away from U.S. standards in the global economy and changing the way they think about security, especially in light of the NSA revelations. There is a level of uncertainty in the world that we have not seen in decades from the world’s only superpower, and I will be closely watching to see how this plays out in 2014.
Am I saying that the U.S. is in decline? No. I won’t go that far and jump on the bandwagon that started picking up steam during the 2008 financial crisis. The dollar is still strong. The Chinese still want their kids to come to American universities. Any internationals who want to move their money out of the country brings it here. We are still a safe bet. The legal system works and we are politically stable. In terms of U.S. innovation in energy, agriculture, biotechnology, nanotechnology, etc; the U.S. still dominates. The “dysfunctional Congress” even passed a $1.1 trillion bill that funds the government through 2014. So no, America is not in decline. Its foreign policy is in decline. It is losing its ability to get what it wants abroad.
The same applies with Obama and Congress. 2014 will be the President’s last best chance to push an agenda for the rest of his term; after 2014 everyone gets so caught up in the election season that it’ll be difficult for his Administration to get any attention or support after this year.
As President Obama goes live in his State of the Union Address on Tuesday, his focus will likely be on the economy, the issues of growing inequality, a partisan Congress and a stagnant middle class, all important concerns. But after all that’s happened in the last 6 months on the international front, pay close attention to which issues the President will emphasize besides the domestic ones. I can’t say what he will choose as foreign policy priorities, but a comprehensive agreement with Iran on curbing their nuclear program, wrapping up Afghanistan and repairing the strained friendships with our allies would be a good start. President Obama still has 3 more years in office, and second-term Presidents in their last couple of years in office often try and leave their mark on foreign policy. And with the Obamacare rollout leaving a black mark on the President’s legacy, foreign policy can help save what’s left of it. And I think he knows this. And with all the talk about “national interests” in foreign policy discussions on the news, most Americans see the only “national interest” as nation building here at home. The polls speak for themselves: A majority of Americans are more disillusioned with the U.S.’s role abroad than ever before. They just don’t see the point anymore. And after Iraq and Afghanistan, “fughettaboutit” isn’t just a Brooklyn word anymore. Let’s just hope that Obama doesn’t fughettabout foreign policy in 2014.
—————————————————-
Last but not least: DAVID KESSLER
#5) Pope Francis and the Catholic Church:
If I had to point to any one trend that I was most excited about or which I thought would be the most profound in 2014, it would be the current direction of the Catholic Church. After emerging from the College of Cardinals as Pontifex Maximus only a year ago, Pope Francis (Formerly Bishop of Argentina Jorge Bergoglio) has already rocked the boat with his humble demeanor, his progressive tone when making remarks on various “hot topics,” and his focus on social justice for the World’s poor. Furthermore, Francis was the first Pope to be elected from the Americas and is the first Jesuit Pope. As of late, Pope Francis has even been named Person of the Year by Time for 2013. And as two young, Jesuit-educated, Christian gentlemen (Pete’s Orthodox and he’s excited for more Ecumenical dialogue between East and West now), we’re pleased with Pope Frank.
I see this pivot in the Church marking a major shift in how it will conduct itself in the 21st century. While recent Popes have made significant strides toward modernizing the Church, namely Pope John XXIII and Pope John-Paul II, Pope Francis seems to be someone who can strike a balance of fully mobilizing the global youth who have been unable to identify with the Church as of late, while still maintaining the more “traditional” Catholic following. From what I gather from Pope Francis’ various remarks, the Church will certainly be much more aggressive in the fight to combat poverty in the so-called, “developing,” world. Furthermore, to conclude endless discourses on questions such as homosexuality, abortion, and other social flashpoints for the Church, the Pope will likely brush those questions aside in favor of addressing what he feels are the most pressing issues: poverty, faith, and community. These are issues that he can unite the most people around and bring them closer to the Church, regardless of their views on the contentious topics.
#4) Syria:
Assad has taken some hard hits, but he has also been able to exploit and leverage the diverse conglomerate of rebel groups to survive. I don’t think he’s going anywhere in 2014.
The prolonged civil war in Syria seems to encapsulate many different global struggles, both direct and proxy. There seems to be no immediate end to the fighting, and one can only hope that 2014 is the year that the bloodshed is concluded. More broadly the Assad regime in Syria, assisted by both Hezbollah and Iran, is struggling to remain in power as an Alawite-led regime in the predominately Sunni state of Syria. Meanwhile, the Sunni Arab States and al-Qaeda continue to push back against the regime and support the revolution.
Though I foresee a prolonged conflict in the Levant for a while longer, any victor in Syria (if there ever is one) would probably be Assad. Although the international community has called for him to step down and/or negotiate a settlement, Assad and his regime have shown resilience and an incredible tolerance for pain; thus far this is evidence that he still commands substantial legitimacy among his supporters, and the state is robust enough to survive in 2014 and beyond. In particular, the military seems to be generally supportive of his leadership, in contrast to what we saw in Egyptian in 2011, where the Egyptian SCAF refused to continue backing then-President Hosni Mubarak. There have been some defections, but as long as the military remains with Assad, I do not believe he will be defeated unless a greater outside force (al-Qaeda or a foreign power) is able to bolster the rebels to overpower the Syrian military or dissuade them from supporting Assad.
#3) A Strained US – Russia Relationship:
Presidential Candidate Mitt Romney memorably stated in 2012 that Russia is, “without question our [the United States’] number-one geopolitical foe.” For the record, the jury is still out on whether this remark is true. But as of late there have been many events to suggest that this Cold War mentality may be relevant. Perhaps the most talked about man involving a deteriorating U.S. –Russian relationship, Edward Snowden, will continue to test US-Russia relations into the coming year. The slight against the U.S. when Russia agreed to give him asylum against cries for “justice” in the U.S. is ever present. Furthermore, we still don’t know the true extent of the damage he’s done or what it is he took with him. Granting him amnesty is probably off the table at this point, since he’s been to two countries that are two of the U.S.’s greatest cyber-security threats (China and Russia). Continuing points from the previous stated trend, the Syrian Civil War is also an indirect struggle between Russia and the United States. The United States has traditionally backed the most powerful Sunni nation in the region, Saudi Arabia, while Russia has traditionally backed the most powerful Shia nation, Iran, and consequently, Syria. Thus, the war in Syria looks ever more like the Cold War-era proxy conflicts. As a positive, the recent deal for Syria to voluntarily give up its chemical weapons for destruction was jointly agreed upon between Secretary of State John Kerry and Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has shown that we can find some common ground on some issues.
C’mon guys. It’s only awkward if you make it awkward.
During the upcoming 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Russia may also display the status of relations between the two nations. To prepare for Russia’s gig on the global stage, President Putin has granted amnesty to thousands of prisoners, including his biggest rival, oil-tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky. This is an attempt to show that Russia has not receded to its harsh Soviet ways. It should be noted, however, that these acts of “good will” may only temporarily improve Russia’s image rather than act as precedent for real reform within Putin’s Russia. The US-Russian relationship will certainly make headlines over the upcoming year, but if the past is a judge for things to come, it looks like only headlines we’ll be reading will be about a stagnant or deteriorating relationship. Let’s hope at least for the former.
#2) A key year for the U.S. in 2014:
On the U.S. domestic front, another exciting year of political gridlock and debacle is on the horizon. As President Obama enters the New Year with his lowest approval ratings since his inauguration, he will be quarterbacking the salvation effort for his signature legislation, the Affordable Healthcare Act (ACA, aka “Obamacare.”) The website setbacks we’ve been reading about will be corrected in the coming weeks and Obamacare will receive its real test: whether the nation is willing to choose to enter healthcare exchanges or pay the penalty of not acquiring healthcare. From my point of view, the ACA is here to stay and Americans will likely warm up to it if, and only if, enough people choose to enroll in Health Insurance rather than pay the penalty. Whether the new system will work as efficiently or as cost effectively as legislators suggested is to be seen in the coming years. However, the Democrats have been running on the ACA (or at least the idea of it) for nearly 50 years. They cannot afford for this to fall through. And it’s unlikely that Republicans will repeal it; it’s much easier to give out a social good than to take it away. Thus, I would say that Obamacare is here to stay at least for the next 8-10 years.
Democrats, Republicans, and pretty much everybody else may be pointing fingers at each other, but one thing’s for sure: U.S. leaders have their work cut out for them in 2014.
On the flip side of American politics, the Republican Party will look to maximize the Obamacare confusion and win support to its cause while overcoming internal discord. Within the party, two very distinct groups have emerged that are going to butt heads: the traditional “establishment” Republicans and the Tea Party Republicans. Outspoken members of the Tea Party faction include Senators Ted Cruz, Rand Paul and Congresswoman Michele Bachmann. Notable establishment GOP members include Senator John McCain and Governor Chris Christie. While the traditional Republicans hold the majority of high ranking Republican positions, the Tea Partiers have secured some significant grassroots support. The Tea Party’s most notable contribution (or lack thereof) to politics was their integral part in triggering the Federal Government Shutdown of 2013. During this episode, the Tea Party legislators did exactly what they said they would do when running for their seats in government: attack the ACA by any means. Unfortunately for both the nation and the Republican Party, this “noble stand” was a decisive defeat that cost the country weeks of Federal Government impotence.
From where I stand, the division and subsequent struggle for the Republican Party, ought to happen as soon as possible. Political infighting followed by consolidation is nothing new, even internationally: Remember how Tony Blair led an internal movement within his Labour Party, moving it from the far-left/left to the center-left. And in 1997 the Labour Party achieved its first election victory since 1979. Likewise, a strong leader from the center-right in the U.S. can assume a similar Tony Blair-like role over the party before the Presidential election of 2016 and move it in a more moderate direction. The sooner and more decisive the struggle, the better. A good barometer of this internal struggle will certainly be the upcoming 2014 congressional elections.
#1) Have No Fear, the Global Economy is Here!:
Finally, in regards to the global economy, I predict a very fruitful year. [The majority of] Europe will return to greater prosperity and competitiveness than before the European debt crisis began. The U.S will continue to grow its economy but it too must find solutions to reducing its public deficit so as to achieve sustainable economic growth. The Chinese will continue to power forward with after a year of robust growth in 2013, although we’re beginning to see signs that they’re beginning to pump the brakes . Japan will continue to be mired in its incredible public debt (which it will attempt to solve by printing more money) and oncoming demographic collapse (which can be mended by immigration reform, but probably little will be done to address that). Russia and Brazil will get their time in the sun during the 2014 Winter Olympics in Russia and the 2014 World Cup in Brazil. Both events will be great opportunities to show off the economic advantages for foreign investment in their respective countries. Russia ought to seek continued growth, which has been strong since President Putin came to power. Brazil, on the other hand, has seen rather sluggish economic growth as of late and will certainly try to reverse that trend. As for the smaller economies of the world, they ought to perform positively if history is any judge of future trends. Overall, the coming year will continue to see a dramatic reduction in Global Poverty and the world economy will grow substantially.
Nobody can account for all the bumps in the roads, and I’m sure 2014 will see its fair share of black swans. But the world will keep spinning.
Two New Year’s Resolutions from two new graduates: Pete: “Apply to Grad School in the Fall so I can defer my student loans next year!” Dave: “See more friends and keep thinking scholarly and happy thoughts! We’ll get through 2014 everybody, let’s also try to enjoy it a little too!”
There are three things people always talk about: Sports, Politics and the Weather. This Thanksgivukkah you’ll be hearing about all three, so here’s a handy guide on how to hold your own against misinformed family and friends at the dinner table.
Guaranteed your first course is going to start off something like: “We don’t make stuff here anymore”
One of the most popular claims that I have wishbone to pick with is when people claim our country’s going to hell in a hand basket because everything’s made in China and all we have to show for it is a “service economy” that just gets us into financial crises. They’ll point out that there are fewer manufacturing jobs in the US today than there were when they were growing up. If you have your smartphone out, pull up this graph and tell them to give it a look:
However, like a good debater, you’ll concede that fewer people are employed in manufacturing today than “back in the day.” And you’ll even show ‘em the numbers to prove it:
The takeaway here is American manufacturing output is enormously higher today than it was 40 years ago [actually, ever…]. However, that growth is at the expense of fewer employees, which in economic jargon means increased productivity; doing more with less. This is because of all sorts of things, like improved business processes and technology to increase efficiency. So we DO make things, lots of things actually. It’s just that we make more things with less people.
Second course: “Jeez, you see Putin lately? Russia’s shoving our face in the dirt and looking better every day. Cold War all over again!”
International Badass? Absolutely. Geopolitical rival? Not quite.
I’m really not sure why Forbes called Putin the most powerful man in the world this year, maybe it has something to do with him being a real-life Bond villain or his Judo black-belt. In all fairness, in terms of awesomeness and manliness, Vladimir Putin is the Russian Teddy Roosevelt. But back to the point. Snowden’s bound to come up in the discussion, but that’s small potatoes when you’re talking a geopolitical rivalry. The Russians also like to troll us every now and then, especially at the U.N. but that’s to be expected. But put this into some perspective: Russia’s latest achievement was persuading Obama to not bomb a country he didn’t really want to bomb anyway to preserve a norm that not really vital to the U.S. national interest. To call the Russian Federation a rival you’d have to prove that wherever we go, the Russians counter us. Latin America? No. Africa? Nothing. South Asia? Don’t see them. The only exception here is Central Asia, where all of the countries ending in “-stan” are. That’s it. Showing some graphs and numbers for this point is pointless. There’s not much to compare.
By far, the most heated topic is probably going to be: “Blehblehbleh [something about China]”
China may very well surpass the U.S. as the world’s largest economy, but let’s not eat all the stuffing before you get to the turkey here.
China is rising and taking over the world and the U.S. and the West is in decline. This is the debate of the century, something that’s been the topic of heated discussion by scholars, policymakers, academics, journalists, just about everybody. There’s no way you’re going to “win” this one.
But if you wanted to have an educated conversation about it, here goes nothing. In a Pew survey, 23 of the 39 countries surveyed said China is or will soon become the “world’s leading superpower.” By 2030 (or sooner for some) the People’s Republic will take over the U.S.’s role as the world’s largest economy. So it may actually become the world’s largest economy. But it will not become a superpower. Although it has seen impressive levels of growth over the years, China has its constraints too. China’s leaders know they must slowly reduce the role of the state in the economy; in other words a transition away from model that is too dependent on corporate and government investment. But that’s what the Communist Party has been running on since its inception, so there’s also an identity crisis surfacing. It’s also pretty clear that it’s fudging its growth data. It also doesn’t help that the proportion of the Chinese population of working age peaked in 2011 and has started decreasing in 2012. By 2025, 14.3% of the population will be 65 and over. An aging population will increase labor costs, reduce savings and investments, and strain healthcare and social welfare systems. Then there’s also the daily challenge of feeding 1 billion people and keeping them unrebellious. And you can’t really fudge your way out of that.
Fundamentally, the Chinese military has been, at its core, an internal peacekeeping force for the provinces. Though there are signs of China seeking to project power outward in the form of developing a blue-water navy, there are rivals in Japan, India, South Korea and a bunch of Southeast Asian nations. Territorial disputes are just part of the trouble. It’s uncertain how this will all play out, and then there’s always the North Koreans a wild card in itself. There are some choices that China has to make down the road if it wants to avoid a war.
Bottom line: Agree to disagree on this one. It’s kind of 50:50 here. Strong economy? Yes, but in many ways it’s still a developing country. Superpower? Maybe in the future, but not yet.
So after playing some catch up on the Iranian nuclear negotiations, it’s pretty clear that the U.S. has made a lot of people in policymaking positions quite angry. But not everyone has been following it, and if you want some quick answers to those questions that you’re too embarrassed to ask, I’m here to help.
Pete, what’s this whole Iran thing about?
Ok, short story: The question revolves around the status of their nuclear program. Iran has always maintained that its nuclear program is purely for peaceful purposes (nuclear power/energy). Even though Iran has denied working toward nuclear weapons, it has said it will not submit to any plan that would totally eliminate its nuclear program. By this they mean the right to enrich their own uranium for energy.
Ok, so they said it’s for peaceful purposes, nuclear power is fine, what’s the problem?
A lot of people are uncomfortable with the fact that they possess the infrastructure and technology to manage the entire nuclear fuel cycle from start to finish – from digging uranium out of the ground to generating power with it. An offshoot of mastering the fuel cycle is that you can take it to the next level by making a nuclear bomb. The problem here is that you can use the same centrifuges that enrich uranium to low quantities (~3.5% for nuclear energy) for enriching uranium to higher quantities (90% for nuclear weapons). Iran has enriched some 200kg of its uranium stockpile up to 20%. Why 20%? I don’t know, it seems like a random number but I’ve read that once you break 20%, enriching to 90% is not so difficult anymore. And that’s enough to get some people worried.
Another issue is that they’ve built facilities without reporting them to the International Atomic Agency (IAEA) beforehand, some in urban areas, others under mountains (Those make them tough targets for a military strike). One such reactor that you may have heard about recently, the “Arak” reactor, that once completed, would be able to make plutonium fairly efficiently, another possible source for nuclear weapons. The Iranians have also deliberately deceived inspectors about secret sites and the status of their program. They’ve also been developing ballistic missile technology and reports surfaced a few years ago that they’ve been trying to develop a nuclear warhead. And it’s not just us who want them to stop; in 2006 the Chinese and the Russians got on board with the U.S. and the rest of the UN Security Council and began pressuring Iran to halt their nuclear program. I’ll say it again: in 2006 the Chinese and the Russians got on board and began pressuring Iran to halt their nuclear program. Considering all the things we can’t get Moscow and Beijing to agree with us on, I’d say that if they’re concerned about this, it’s becoming a problem.
Hmm, sounds like it may be a problem. What have we been doing about it?
So sinceIran has not complied, it’s been punished with economic sanctions, a great deal of which has hit its oil and gas industry. If you want to learn more about them, here’s a good backgrounder on them, courtesy of BBC. The Iranians have also been experienced technical setbacks, the most widely cited example courtesy of a computer virus known as Stuxnet, allegedly developed by the Israelis and the United States (which has been denied by both). Also every now and then a nuclear scientist doesn’t show up to work at the lab because he’s too busy getting blown up [possibly by Israeli intelligence]. And while not explicitly using the phrase “military strike,” President Obama and other senior administration officials have repeatedly claimed that “all options are on the table” when handling this issue.
Yikes, so why aren’t the Iranians backing down?
The 1968 NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), which almost every country in the world abides by, says that parties of the treaty have the “inalienable right…to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.” So the quick answer is that international law says they can.
The more complicated answer is that the Iranian Revolution of ’79 still lives. What do I mean by that? The same people who are in power are vanguards of the anti-Western revolution that established the Islamic Republic of Iran when they overthrew the Western-backed Shah in 1979. They’re still pretty upset about the decades of interference on the part of the U.S. and Western Europe in the Iranian political economy during the 19th and 20thcenturies. And as the heirs of the great Persian Empire, they are a proud people. They want to be recognized as a regional power again, and a nuclear program is a way into the country club.
Another reason, if Iran really does want a nuclear weapons capability, is defense. Iranian leaders believe that the U.S. and her allies (namely Saudi Arabia and Israel) will stop at nothing to overthrow their regime. The last President of the United States called the regimes in Iraq, Iran and North Korea the “axis of evil” and so far we’re 1 for 3 in the regime-change business. Another leader by the name of Muammar Gaddafi willingly relinquished his nuclear stockpile years back but just a few years ago saw his country bombarded by NATO before he was dragged through the streets of Tripoli and executed. And let’s not forget that in the 80s Saddam was on our side, and we gave him plenty of help in his war with Iran that lasted 8 years and killed hundreds of thousands on both sides. With this kind of baggage weighing on the leadership’s mind, a nuclear deterrent may be an attractive option.
But even if they didn’t want a nuclear weapon, the Iranians have managed to give many countries good reason to suspect that their “peaceful” nuclear program is actually a cover for a covert push to develop a weapons program.
What about Israel? Their Prime Minister was trolling the negotiations and just called this deal we brokered with Iran “a historic mistake.”
In many ways, Israel has good reason to be worried about a more powerful Iran. The Iranian leadership has repeatedly called the Jewish state a “cancer that must be removed” and actively supports Hezbollah and Hamas, the Lebanese and Palestinian militant groups with a long history of attacking Israel. But it’s pretty doubtful that the Iranians are going to fire a nuke over Tel Aviv or Riyadh (the Saudis are also a party with security concerns about a nuclear Iran). If they do that, Tehran just signed their death warrant and it’s game over for the regime. I’m sure they know that. But a nuclear Iran may be emboldened enough by their new deterrent to support and finance Hezbollah and Hamas. It may also start a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, with governments in Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, etc. all pursuing a nuclear weapons capability to counter Iran. So it’s a mixed bag, but if you stick your hand in it, you’ll probably get stung pretty bad. That being said, Iran is a problem for Israel, but not in the same way that it’s a problem for the emirs in the Gulf. I’m going to go out on a limb here and say that Israel may not like it, but it can probably live with a belligerent Iran.
That actually kind of really sucks. What’s our plan?
The options are really contingent on what you want to achieve. All around though, they’re not all that great.
The first not-all-that-great plan is to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites (the ones we know about). Best case scenario, this would probably set them back a year or two, maybe even just a few months. Bottom line though, it will make Tehran more likely to develop a nuclear weapon if they weren’t going to already. We’d also probably lose support from key international players to stop Iran’s nuclear program. In fact, we’ll probably lose international support for a lot of other things going forward.
The second not-all-that-great plan is a follow up of the first bad plan: an invasion by our Armed Forces and a coalition of the willing (whichever countries want to help out) to overthrow the regime. Why not go all the way? You bomb them and give them a chance to recover? You’re not sure if you got all the nuclear sites? All that fissile material lying around waiting to get stolen now? C’mon bro, finish the job…Unfortunately whichever President authorizes that is doomed. After Iraq, this option is not happening.
The third not-all-that-great plan is to try and overthrow the regime in other ways. This is problematic, since the regime has shown and incredible amount of resilience since ‘79. Even during the “Green Revolution,” the 2009 protests after the disputed Iranian presidential elections, citizens were calling for government reforms, not the overthrow of the ayatollahs. Furthermore, any internal movements that we give even moral support to would lose all their legitimacy anyway.
The fourth not-all-that-great plan is to just keep doing what we’re doing: Force Iran to unconditionally surrender and give up its nuclear program in its entirety. Like I said before, those sanctions have definitely been biting, and covert action like cyber-warfare and assassinations have been successful in setting their program back some. But despite what we’ve been doing, the Iranian nuclear program has continued to grow. We can try to delay it, but that’s all we’d be doing: delaying.
The fifth not-all-that-great plan: negotiating a deal directly with Tehran. If my Spidey senses are spot on this time, this seems to be the thrust of what the P5 +1 (U.S., Russia, China, Britain, France, + Germany) actually hopes to accomplish in the near future: Iran gets its nuclear program, but with enough restrictions and inspections that everyone can accept it as peaceful. The downside is that this would be difficult to enact and no deal will please the Israelis, the Saudis or our Congress. Another thing to think about is that this all hinges on actually trusting Iran with a nuclear program, after it has cheated on past deals.
Ok, so we are negotiating with them, that looks like the least worst option. What’s this “deal” or “agreement” everyone’s talking about now?
The most straightforward explanation I found was this one by the New York Times; it has lots of pictures and short sentences. The agreement does not guarantee that Iran will make a bomb, but it certainly complicates it. The agreement lasts 6 months, when a more permanent agreement is supposed to get hammered out: No more enrichment above 5%; nuclear-related activity (no production of fuel, no nuclear research) on the Arak reactor stops; no new centrifuges; daily inspections to all nuclear facilities; all in exchange for unfreezing some overseas assets and some limited relief of sanctions that only amount to a few billion.
Good deal or bad deal?
It’s actually really not the deal that we should be thinking about now. This is an interim agreement that is easily revocable in six months if a comprehensive deal falls apart. It’s a test to see whether the Iranians are for real about this. But if I had to judge, it’s a relatively safe deal that puts the burden of proof on Iran while at the same time showing some goodwill on our part to negotiate a settlement down the road. Diplomacy is a two-way street, and easing some basic sanctions while maintaining the overreaching architecture let’s the Iranians walk away with something while not giving away too much on our part. And it’s pretty likely that the negotiators needed approval from the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in order to agree to the abovementioned agreement and bring home the bacon [ok, bad analogy, especially for a Muslim country] so that’s a pretty good sign. Only he can give the “ok” to build a bomb, and to our knowledge he has not given the order. This agreement blocks the most likely avenues for the Iranians to go forward with that. But as with all things, the devil is always in the details, and if any comprehensive agreement falls through, it will be because of those. I do still think that criticisms of this agreement are premature; the real deal hasn’t even started yet. And if the Iranians do end up cheating, we’ll be in a better position to ratchet up the sanctions again and dust off the war-plans.
Long-term though, it’s not so much the nuclear thing that I’m thinking about so much as Iran’s future in the Middle East. Strategically, we have nothing to gain by artificially weakening a country with a young, educated, large population that can be used to balance the Sunni-dominated Middle East. I’ll be looking for signs that we’re ready to start talking about reintegrating them into the international community. Bottom line: We have nothing to lose by gaming this thing out. And speaking out gaming it out, enjoy the football games and have a Happy Thanksgivukkah!
deal_getty_3.jpg){kind=spacer}
Brooklyn Diplomat 